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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
April 15, 1983 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 2 
No. 82-1256 
LYNCH (Mayor, Pawtuc~~' ~L 
Rhode Island), et~ ov~ 
v. 
et @) (){ DONNELLY, 
Cert to CA 1 
(Fairchild, Bow 
(dissent: ...::;C...;:;;a=m~~;:,..-G_-_.,.._• __ • __ 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr, the City of Pawtucket, argues that the 
inclusion of a nativity scene in their Christmas display does not 
violate the Establishment Clause. WA4-IZ~ ,_,fs ~ ~ 
2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: Resg , several individuals and A.4.lt., 
the Rhode Island affiliate of t filed suit in D.R.I. one ~~ 
~- ~~~ ~td--~~t"~~? • 
~~~ ~,_,~ 
~~ 
~ Cl/7.1' ~' ~ 
~ ~ dtrJnf ~r 
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1eek before Christmas, 1980, seeking a temporary restraining 
order requiring the immediate removal of the nativity scene 
erected by the City of Pawtucket; resps alleged that the nativity 
scene, or creche, violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Thereafter, resps withdrew their request for 
immediate relief, allowing the creche to remain unchallenged for 
the 1980 Christmas season, after agreement that the case would 
proceed to trial on an accelerated schedule. 
Each year the City of Pawtucket uses Hodgson Park, a 
• 
privately owned open space of approximately 40,000 square feet, 
to erect a Chr~tma; dis~laj· The lighted display, built by City -employees and paid for by City funds, included in 1980, among 
~ther things, a~ishing well,~~ta's House (inhabited by a live 
~
danta who distributed candy), ~rouping of caroler/musician -figures in old-fashioned dress surrounded by six large candles, a 
0•village" composed of four houses and 
pointed stars,~hree wooden Christmas 
..,. 
a church, four large five-
v'l. 40 tree cutouts, a 1ve -
foot Christmas tree strung with lights, Santa's sleigh and 
reindeer, a large wreath hung from candy-striped poles, large 
letters spelling out "Season's Greetings," 21 cut-out characters 
representing such varied characters as a clown, a dancing 
elephant, a robot, and a teddy bear and the nativity scene at -
issue in this case. The nativity scene was placed in "the 
foreground of the display" in a space 10 feet by 14 feet and the 
figures were "approximately life sized." 
After the accumulation of a considerable amount of 
testimony, the DC (Pettine) issued a 54-page opinion expressing ~ ~ 
- 3 -
~ •is decision that the creche violated the Establishment Clause. 
The DC relied on the three-part test developed by this Court in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), for determining whether a 
statute violated the Establishment Clause. In Lemon the court 
said: 
"First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principal or 
primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; ••. finally, the statute 
must not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion." Id., at 612-613. 
With respect to the first part of the test, the City 
that the creche, when viewed as part of the whole display, served 
an economical purpose in attracting shoppers to the area and 
~erved a cultural purpose in showing all aspects of the national 
holiday of Christmas. The DC rejected the alleged economical 
purpose, relying on testimony that the Christmas display would 
attract shoppers even without the nativity scene. In response to 
the cultural purpose, the DC concluded that, unlike the other 
parts of the display, the nativity scene remains essentially a 
religious symbol and to the extent it shows some history of 
culture it reflects the religious nature of that culture; this, 
found the DC, is not a secular purpose. The DC then concluded 
that since the City had not tried to disclaim the religious 
nature of the creche or in any way minimize its religious 
connotations it could only be found that the City had "tried to 
endorse and promulgate religious beliefs by including a nativity 
;cene in the display." 
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In response to the second part of the Lemon test, the DC 
concluded that the nativity scene had the effect of advancing 
religion. The court relied on testimony that "people knew that 
the ••• display was sponsored at least in part by the city" and 
that "viewers would not regard the creche as an insignificant 
part of the display." Absent any evidence that the City had 
tried to present the creche in a broad, neutral, educational 
context, or "to shift the viewer's attention away from the 
creche's religious message," the DC found that "despite its 
passive nature, erection of the creche has the real and 
substantial effect of affiliating the city with the Christian 
beliefs that the creche represents." 
The DC also found that the creche had caused excessive 
government entanglement with religion. As proof of this 
entanglement, the DC relied on "the atmosphere •.. of anger, 
hostility, name calling, political maneuvering, all prompted by 
the fact that someone had questioned the city's ownership and 
display of a religious symbol." 
A ~ided panel of the CA 1 affirmed. The court adoptd the 
DC's conclusions in applying the three part Lemo~ test, even 
though theCA thought the DC's basis for a finding of 
entanglement might be suspect. The CA then looked to this 
Court's recent decision in Larson v. Valente, ---u.s. 
(1982), and intimated that instead of applying the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman test, the Court now sanctioned application of 
:raditional "strict scrutiny" to these kinds of cases. Then the 
CA 1 found that since the DC had determined that the nativity 
- 5 -
~cene did not further any legitimate secular purpose it obviously 
was not in furtherance of a compelling state interest. In 
dissent, Judge Campbell reasoned that Christmas is now a secular 
~ 
holiday and it makes no sense to require suppression of any 
aspect of that holiday. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The City argues that this decision 
conflicts with numerous state and federal decisions. See, e.g., 
O'Hair v. Clements, 638 F.2d 1231 (CA 5), cert. denied, 454 u.s. 
878 (1981) ~ Florey v. Sioux Falls School District, 619 F.2d 1311 
(CA 8), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 987 (1980) ~ Allen v. Morton, 495 
F.2d 65 (DC Cir. 1973) ~Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 
F.2d 29 (CA 10 1973)~ Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church 
~nd State v. City and County of Denver, 526 F.Supp. 1310 (D. 
Colo. 1981) (appeal pending in CA 10) ~ Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. 
v. City of Eugene_, 276 Ore. 1007 (1976), cert. denied, 438 u.s. 
878 (1977)~ Meyer v. Oklahoma City, 476 P.2d 789 (Okla.), cert. 
denied, 409 u.s. 980 (1972)~ Paul v. Dade County, 202 S.2d 833 
(Fla. App.), aff'd., 207 S.2d 690 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 
U.S. 1041 (1968). The City contends that the DC went wrong in 
applying the Lemon v. Kurtzman test by failing to give sufficient 
consideration to the Christmas display as a whole, of which the 
nativity scene was only a small part. The City argues that the 
purpose of this display was clearly not to advance religion, but 
rather to show the various parts of what is now largely a secular 
holiday. The City also argues that when the display is viewed as 
. whole it cannot be said that its "primary effect" is to advance 
religion. Finally, the City contends that the political debate 
- 6 -
round by the DC surrounding the creche provides no basis for 
excessive entanglement under the Lemo~ test. The City further 
1 
claims that the CA t acted erroneously in trying to "supplant the 
tripartite test of Lemon with the strict scrutiny test" used by 
the Court in Larson v. Valente. 
In a very short response, resps try to distinguish the cases 
relied on by the City for a conflict. For those they cannot 
distinguish, resps argue that the decisions are too old or are 
wrong. Resps cite no cases in support of their view, but instead 
argue that each case should turn on its own facts and the facts 
as found by the DC in this case support an Establishment Clause 
violation. Resps argue that theCA 4's reliance on Larson, even 
~ f erroneous, would not require review by this Court since the CA 
affirmed the DC's findings under Lemon. 
4. DISCUSSION: As admitted by the DC, this case squarely 
conflicts with Citizens Concerned for Separation v. Denver, 
supra. The City has pointed to several other additional 
conflicts. In my opinion these conflicts, coupled with the 
importance of the issue, make this case a prime candidate for 
plenary review. 
I recommend a grant. 
There is a response. 
4/6/83 
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Motion of Anne Neamon fo~ave to 
Proceed Pro se for the Purr:ose of 
Filing a Brief as Amicus Curiae 
SUMMARY: ~ ~ movant seeks leave of the Court to file a (ro se amicus 
brief in Lynch v. Donnelly, No. 82-1256 (whether nativity scene violates 
establishment clause) • Movant argues that she should be permitted to 
participate as a ~ se amicus because: (1) ·she has her own fundamental 
rights to defend the Constitution; (2) This case presents an undebatable 
compelling national question; and (3) She does not have the funds to retain 
an attorney to file the brief on her behalf. 
DISCUSSION: This court has generally not entertained requests by 
individuals to file pro~ as amici. See Bates v. state Bar of Arizona, 429 
u.s. 1036 (1977). Rule 36, which governs the filing of amicus briefs, makes 
~ no explicit reference to the requirement that only members of the Bar may file 
~~- ~ WJ.Q ~ b._ ~(flood.. o\ ~ -- ~. ntocal. ~ 
cb ,..,l: ~ 4..:. ~ 0 cJoJ..d. ~ (1, ().. "\_cdlvL a\-~ ~I 
~ ~ f\o ~ CQIV\..~ ~ ~ ~. -::r~ 
' , .... 
such briefs. But that Rule does note the applicability of . other Rules which 
do make reference to the need for appearance by counsel. ~·  Rule 33.2(a). 
And as a matter of policy it would seem appropriate to keep the floodgates on 
pro ~ amicus briefs closed. This motion should be denied. 
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Lynch v. Donnelly 
Joseph Neuhaus September 30, 1983 
Question Presented 
Does the inclusion of a creche in a Christmas celebration 
provided by the City of Pawtucket, R.I., violate the Establish-
ment Clause? 
Summary 
There are three Establishment Clause tests that this Court's . ...., 
cases or the parties have suggested could be used to decide this 
case. The most stringent test is the strict scrutiny standard 
applied in Larson v. Valente, 456 U •• 228 (1982), which is used 
for state actions distinguishing among religious denominations 
rather than offering a benefit or detriment to all religions. 
The second test is the tradi tiona! three-part test set out in ---__:._-----. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602 (1971), for gauging when state 
action in general impermissibly advances or inhibits religion, or 
involves the state in religion. Finally, the Government in this 
case, as well as Judge Campbell's dissent in the CA, offer what 
is in effect a broad derivative of the test of historical usage 
en~nciated last Term in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 s. Ct. 3330 
(1983). 
In this memorandum, I conclude that the Larson test is not 
applicable to this case, and that the clear religious signifi-
cance of a creche prevents Pawtucket's celebration from passing 
& e Lemon test. I believe the Government's argument that some 
~eligious manifestations have been and should be a part of public 
life is not unsound generally. I do not think it would be wise 
to announce or apply such a broad principle in this case, howev-
er, because the religious manifestation here advances only a sin-
-* gle denomination rather than the transcendent principles of reli-
gion generally. 
1. Larson v. Valente 
t4$'2.--o 
In Larson, the Court announced the principle that when it is 
presented with "a state law granting a denominational 
preference," it will "treat the law as suspect and apply ' ... ...._ __ 
strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." 456 u.s., ---- ---
at 244. The Court made clear that such scrutiny will be trig-
gered only by "explicit and deliberate distinctions between reli-
gious organizations," and not merely by "a facially neutral stat-
ute" that happens to have a "'disparate impact'" on different 
religious organizations. Id., at 256 n.23. JUSTICE BRENNAN, who 
wrote Larson, has since phrased the test more broadly as applying 
to state programs "that discriminate[] among religious faiths, 
and not merely in favor of all religious faiths." Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 103 s.ct., at 3340 n.ll (Brennan, J., dissenting). In this 
case, there is apparently no explicit discrimination against non-
Christian faiths, Qg! the inclusion of the creche by no means can 
be said to be facially neutral or to benefit all religious 
L~-faiths. 
~-LJ 
I suspect the proper test for the application of Larson is ~~/0 
neither as strict as that opinion itself intimated nor as loos~ 
as JUSTICE BRENNAN has rephrased it. Larson appears to invoke 
traditional equal protection analysis. Under that analysis, it 
is not sufficient to show a discriminatory impact; a purpose to 
discriminate must also be shown before a violation will be found. --See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 • 55, 66 (1980) (plu-
rality op.} (stating "the basic principle that only if there is 
purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment") (voting dis-
tricts); accord id., at 94-103 (White, J., dissenting). The 
point of the Larson requirement that any discrimination among 
religious sects be explicit is that a discriminatory intent will 
not be inferred from the mere fact of a disparate impact. While 
I suspect that such an intent may be inferable from something 
less than explicit discrimination among sects in a given legisla-
tive act, some showing that other religious groups have been pur-
posefully excluded from the benefits given Christians would seem 
to be the minimum needed. There is no suggestion of that in the 
record here. 
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman 
The Lemon test for when a state action passes muster under 
the Establishment Clause is no doubt familiar: (1) the action 
must have a secular purpose; (2) its "principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3) ------it must not foster an "excessive entanglement" with religion. 
403 u.s., at 612-613. 
a. Purpose. The city advanced two purposes for setting up 
the creche in its Christmas display. First, it offered a cultur-
al or traditional purpose of acknowledging the religious heritage 
of the holiday, as a sort of exposition of the way in which Amer-
icans celebrate Christmas. Second, the city said it was motivat-
ed by a commercial purpose of encouraging shopping in the city's 
downtown malls. Petn. App. A30, A53-A54 (DC opinion). (An ini-
tial assertion of an aesthetic purpose was not pressed. Id., at 
A53 n.28.) The DC rejected these asserted purposes. Based 
largely on an inference drawn from the use of a "patently reli-
A9-c:. 
gious symbol" like the creche, the court found that the city's bC 
purpose was to advance, rather than merely to acknowledge, the~ 
Christian view of the birth of Christ. Id., at A57. It found 
that that inference was not dissipated by the context in which 
the creche was placed, noting that the city did not disavow such 77 .. . 
a purpose, that the only religious heritage presented was the -
majority's, and that the mayor had vowed to fight to keep Christ 7 
in Christmas. Id., at A58-A60. 
Thus, the DC's finding of a nonsecular purpose was not de-
rived from any direct evidence of purpose but was based on an 
inference raised by the religious nature of a creche. This ap-
preach is not improper under this Court's cases. In Stone v. 
\.........- Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam), the Court found that 
. -~Kentucky statute requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in 
~s~hoolrooms had a "plainly religious" purpose. That finding ap-
pears to have been based solely on the view that "[t]he Ten Com-
mandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Chris-
tian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular 
purpose can blind us to that fact." Ibid. (footnote omitted) • 
Nevertheless, because the religious "nature" of an object is es-
sentially the effect it has on the average viewer, this kind of a 
finding of purpose is little different from a finding of reli-
gious effect. The fundamental defect, if any, in using such an 
overwhelmingly religious symbol is therefore in its 'f eligious 
\\ 
effect, so I will discuss the religious or secular "nature" of 
the creche in the next subsection. 
. . 
b. Effect. It should be noted at the outset that while Lem-
on refers to the "principal or primary" effect, you have written 
that no comparison among the various effects is required. Com-
mittee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v.~l3 u .. 
756, 783 n.39 (1973} ("We do not think that such metaphysical 
judgments are either possible or necessary."}. Instead, the 
state action need only have "the direct 
~-
advancing religion" to be impermissible. 
and immediate effect of 
g~;L..~ 
Ibid. ,,~.....,. •• ~, ... ~ ~ 
The DC found first that the creche is a patently religious 
symbol. The court noted that the creche does not merely depict 
the historical fact of Christ's birth, but also makes a statement 
about the extraordinary nature of the child by presenting his 
birth as attended by angels, revered by shepherds, and sought out 
by kings. The court further found that the l 
unlike Santa Claus, Christmas trees, stars, and bells, 
Petn. App. A45-A46. 
creche, 
has not lost its religious significance. It is faithful to the 
biblical accounts and needs no specialized knowledge to reveal 
its religious meaning. For anyone with the most rudimentary 
knowledge of Western religious beliefs, the religious message of 
the creche is immediately and unenigmatically conveyed. Id., at 
A46-A4 7. 
Second, the DC found that the context does not change the ~C: 
religious effect of the display. The creche is "centrally and 
prominently positioned" and the surrounding secular symbols do 
not distract attention from it. Id., at A66-A67: see also J.A. 
at 170-178 (pictures}. Moreover, "[t]he City's Christmas display 
is neither a museum exhibit where one goes expecting to see cul-
tural artifacts, nor an educational course in which one expects 
to be taught about heritage and tradition •••• The display is a 
celebration of the holiday, not an exposition about it." Id., at 
A67. 
Third, the court found that the appearance of official spon-
sorship confers more than a remote and incidental benefit on 
Christianity, noting that the "aura of governmental approval is a 
subsidy as real and as valuable as financial assistance." Id., 
at A69. 
No one has really argued that the DC was wrong on its first 
point. Petrs admit that the creche has a uniquely religious im- ~~ 
pact in certain settings. Brief of the Petitioners at 20 ("The 
solitary trace of religiosity in the entire municipal celebration 
is the creche •••• Of all the Christmas symbols, the creche alone 
retains some religious significance in a religious setting 
•••• "). The dissent below also appears to acknowledge the con-
tinued religious force of a creche, although it is less clear 
about whether other Christmas symbols are different. Petn. App. 
Al9. I agree with the DC that the creche is unique among the~ 
Christmas symbols represented in its religious impact. It has 
not been transmuted into a jolly and universal symbol like Santa 
Claus or the tree. It plainly depicts the miraculous birth of 
the Messiah. Unlike the other symbols, which can be and usually 
are taken to represent Christmas in its broad, good-will-to-men 
sense, it is hard for a person in our culture to associate the 
creche with anything other than the Christian view of the birth 
of Christ. Accord Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 69, 73 (CADC 
•. 
,, 
1973) (the creche is "obviously a religious symbol"); id., at 87 
(Leventhal, J., concurring) ("it is plain that a depiction of the 
Nativity scene is primarily of religious significance and consti-
tutes a 'clear religious symbol'"). 
Petrs' main argument, however, is that 
of the creche is dissipated by the context 
They argue that the creche is a minor part 
the religious nature ~/.r-t.­
 
of its presentat~
of an overwhelmingly' 
secular celebration. The Government does not appear seriously to 
advance this view, see Brief for the United States at 3; the dis-
sent below seems to think that all the symbols of Christmas re-
tain religious significance but that for historical reasons the 
display of such religious symbols is not unacceptable, Petn. App. 
Al9-A20. 
I find the DC' s position more persuasive than petrs'. The 
Christmas display here is not a museum or an exposition about the 
ways in which Christmas is celebrated. It is itself a celebra-
tion. The placement of secular symbols around the centrally po-
sitioned creche does not change the nature of the creche. If 
anything, it tends to emphasize by contrast the religious nature 
of the latter. While inclusion of the creche is not active wor-
ship like prayer in the school, it is also not a neutral presen-
tation like a comparative religion course. Cf. Abington School 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 u.s. 203, 225 (1963) (comparing impermissi-
ble prayer in schools with permissible comparative religion 
courses). 
(In Allen, the majority found that the context of the nation-
al Christmas Pageant of Peace dispelled the religious nature of 
•'J'" :· 
the creche, but there the government posted plaques stating that 
the creche was intended to manifest the religious heritage of 
Christmas, not to celebrate it, the pageant was sponsored by a 
more or less independent group, and the government's support was~~ 
~/9b-G 
limited to the non-creche aspects of the pageant. 495 F.2d at 
73-74. In any case, the court found excessive entanglement and 
granted the plaintiffs an injunction because of the government's 
participation in the planning and organization committees of the 
independent group.} 
I also agree that the inclusion of the creche suggests the 
city's approval of the religious message conveyed by it. This 
advances religion in the same way that erecting a cross on a 
mountain top would, see ACLU of Georgia v. Rabun Cty. Chamber of 
Commerce, 698 F. 2d 1098 (1983) (striking down cross in state park 
as religiously motivated), and in much the same way that posting 
the Ten Commandments did in Stone v. Graham. These cases estab-
lish that symbols have power and that government use of them 
raises Establishment Clause concerns. As a result, Pawtucket's 
use of the creche vflunks the Lemon test because it has the direct 
and immediate effect of advancing religion. ~ "7-~ ? 
Holding that the creche is barred from the city's Christmas 
celebration would not undermine the government's recognition or 
celebration of the Christmas holiday itself, nor the many exam-
ples of religion in public life cited in the briefs (e.g. , "In 
God We Trust," "God save this Honorable Court ••.• "). ~~ 
There are two bases for distinguishing the creche from 
Christmas. First, as the DC found, Christmas today has a funda-
mentally secular side that the government is free to recognize. 
This is the side that large department stores and malls recognize 
in their displays of Santa and the elves, the little drummer boy, 
etc. It is also the side recognized by The New York Times' list 
of the families and individuals most deserving of charity during 
the holidays. If Pawtucket's celebration lacked only the creche, 
it would be essentially the same as these and would not have the 
religious character it does now. The fact that this secular 
holiday arose out of and coincides with the Christian holiday as 
opposed to the last day of Hanukkah would no more condemn govern-
ment's recognition of it than did the choice of Sunday as a day 
of rest in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451 ( 19 61) (uphold-
ing Sunday closing laws) ("It would seem unrealistic for enforce-
ment purposes and perhaps detrimental to the general welfare to 
require a State to choose a common day of rest other than that 
which most persons would select of their own accord."). 
A second legitimate reason to allow government recognition of 
Christmas but not the creche is that this Court has recognized 
the distinction between accommodating the religious beliefs of 
the population and advancing them. See B'nai B'rith Amicus Brief 
at 17-18. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 u.s. 306 (1952), the Court 
upheld a system whereby students were released from public school 
in order to attend religious instruction. The Court found that 
this system merely "respects the religious nature of our people 
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs." 
Id., at 314. The Court distinguished the case of McCollum v. 
Board of Educ., 333 u.s. 203 (1948), in which it had held uncon-
... .-f'i 
stitutional a plan under which Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish 
religion teachers hired by their respective churches would come 
into the schools and teach students who asked for the instruc-
tion. The Zorach Court said the difference was that "[i]n the 
McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction 
and the force of the public school was used to promote that in-
struction. Here, as we have said, the public schools do no more 
than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside reli-
gious instruction." 343 u.s., at 315. Similarly, government 
recognition of Christmas would only accommodate the public sched-
ule to the religious needs of the people, while sponsorship of a 
creche or other plainly religious symbol in the city's celebra-
tion would promote their religion. The problem with this ration-
ale is that it does not by itself justify the government doing 
more than merely recognizing Christmas as a holiday. Combined 
with the foregoing distinction between the secular and religious 
sides of Christmas, however, I think some government celebration ;> 
of Christmas is adequately supported. 
Requiring the city not to include a creche in its display 
would not require that the frequent governmental references to 
religion be struck down. These references, catalogued in the 
Government's brief at 6-15, are nearly all invocations of the 
concept of a Supreme Being generally, rather than references to 
any particular religion or denomination. Notably absent from the 
Thanksgiving Day proclamations back to the time of Washington, 
for example, are any references to Christ. The same is true of 
the motto, or the insertion of "under God" in the Pledge. The 
only references to a particular religion appear to be recent ecu-
menical proclamations such as Jewish Heritage Week, which, given 
their authors, probably have a merely cultural purpose and ef-
fect. 
The motivation for this studied avoidance of denominational 
references is, of course, political: religious sects express 
their fervor at the voting booths while, until recently, atheists 
and other nonreligious types did not, at least in great numbers. 
But history and case law support the distinction. The original 
conception of the Establishment Clause was to ensure that the ~ 
national government would not establish a national church, in 
derogation of the state churches already set up. See McGowan, 
366 u.s., at 440-441. Justice Story suggested that the purpose 
was not to bar any advancement of religion by government, but to 
prevent the advancement of one sect over another. 3 J. Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1871 
{1833). The Thanksgiving Day proclamations further show that the 
Founders, with the notable exception of Jefferson, did not think 
the Establishment Clause barred the government from advancing 
religion generally, but only from advancing any particular sect. 
While this Court's cases do not go that far, see, e.g., Lem-
on, they do indicate that action in favor of religion generally 
is of far less concern than action advancing the cause of any 
given religion, see, e.g., Marsh, 103 s.ct., at 3335 {legislative 
prayers were not seen by Founding Fathers as "placing the govern-
ment's 'official seal of approval on one religious view'" but as 
"'conduct whose • • • effect • • . harmonize [d) with the tenets of 
,. 
some or all religions.'" (quoting McGowan}}; Larson, 456 u.s., at 
244-246 & n.23 (discrimination among religions, as opposed to in 
favor of religion generally, is subject to strict scrutiny}; Lem-
on 403 u.s., at 623 ("But in Walz [v. Tax Comm'n, 397 u.s. 664 
(1970} (upholding tax exemptions}] we dealt with a status under 
state tax laws for the benefit of all religious groups. Here we 
are confronted with ••. appropriations that benefit relatively 7 ? 
few religious groups."}. The distinction makes a lot of sense, 
~
since the conflict and oppression that the Framers sought to 
' .. 
avoid is, even today, far more likely to result from discrimina- _f~ 
A-~~ 
tion between sects than from discrimination against the nonreli-~
 
gious. The latter tend to care less about these matters than do ~ 
~ believers of the "oppressed" sects. 
Thus, the creche is different from the references to religion 
generally about which concern has been shown, because it advances 
the religious view of only one sect--Christians--rather than ad-
vancing belief in a transcendent force generally. (Another basis 
for upholding the general invocations to God in courtrooms and 
pledges would be that these have lost any true religious signifi-~ 
.. } ~-cance. .Marsh, 103 s.ct., at 3349 (Brennan, J., d1ssent1ng • As ~ 
noted above, this is not true of the creche.} 
c. Entanglement. The entanglement part of the Lemon test 
has been said to have two parts: administrative entanglement 
resulting from the state joining with religion to run a religious 
program, and political divisiveness resulting from the perception 
that government is favoring some religion. See Lemon, 403 u.s., 






dence of administrative entanglement in this case, and I agree 
that it has not been present. I would note only that there is 
some suggestion in the record that the mayor of Pawtucket told a 
press conference that he intended to place a menorah at the site 
the following year "in honor or our Jewish brethren who have sup-
ported us in this." Pet. App. A32. This would appear to be pre-
cisely the kind of hand-in-hand entanglement of politics with 
religion that should be avoided. Here, though, it is only 
threatened and may not be official city policy. The political-
divisiveness factor as it may be present in this case is essen- ~ 
tially an elaboration on the question of religious effect, and 
need not be dealt with separately. 
3. Marsh v. Chambers and 
Acknowledging Religious Heritage ( ~ ~) 
Both the SG and Judge Campbell in dissent have urged a third 
test that to some extent predicted the result in Marsh v. Cham-
bers sustaining the centuries-old practice of legislative pray-
ers. Neither the SG nor the dissent would argue that there is 
present here the "unique history" that there was in Marsh sug-
gesting a specific intent on the part of the Framers to approve 
the questioned practice. No one has suggested that use of Nativ-
~c~~~L.-1-~ 
i ty scenes goes any where near that far back • ...., But both Judge 
Campbell and the SG do suggest that the use of creches, like the 
practice of legislative prayers in Marsh, "has become part of the 
fabric of our society," and is not an establishment of religion 
but "simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 
among the people of this country." Marsh, 103 S.Ct., at 3336. 
For Judge Campbell, the test would appear to be whether the ques-
tioned practice has "become an ingrained part of our culture." 
See Petn. App. Al9 (Campbell, J., dissenting). To excise these 
traditional symbols of Christmas would make government hostile to 
religion, they say, and would sanitize the holiday of its essen-
tial meaning. ~5 
The primary problem with ~his argument is its application to 
this ca;e. The SG a~..._s-t~h;---<<a-;-t--1~t;-;h;-e~-c=-1=-· t;-y~' -=-s s=-=p=-o=-n=-s:-o~r~s"""fi_.,.l-:::P:---:-o-;;-rr.he 
creche should be permitted because of the many manifestations of 
religion in public life. As noted above, however, what is in-
grained in the national culture is not government advancement of 
particular religions but government advancement of religion gen-
erally. To extend this to allow government to promote particular 
sects would be directly contrary to what the Framers had in mind 
and to the lessons of several hundred years of history and case 
law. See supra pages 11-13. 
Judge Campbell appears to take a different view, suggesting 
------~--~--~~-----------------------------~ 
that what is ingrained is the government's use of the creche it-
self, or at least its use of the "ancient symbols" of religion. 
There is, however, no evidence of this other than Pawtucket's own 
forty years of experience. My experience is to the contrary: 
local governments in towns I have lived in scrupulously have 
steered clear of appearing to promote any particular religious 
view in any way. They, like the national government, have for 
sound political reasons (given the proximity of Hanukkah to 
Christmas) declined to celebrate the Christian nature of the 
holiday. It may be that Judge Campbell's view is that local 







our culture. But no case has ever suggested that government in-
volvement in religion is an area that can .be left to the good /~ 
sense of local majorities. Since religious sects tend to cluster 
together in order to worship communally, allowing the historical 
practices of the local government to continue would seriously ~;; 
~ 
threaten lo~ m~or i ties. Moreover, it would tend to encourage } (' 
the development of isolated, government-sponsored religious in-
tolerance. Both of these possibilities were intended to be fore-
closed by the application of the Establishment Clause to the 
states. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 u.s. 296, 310 (1940). 
Assuming that local practice would be insufficient, the real 
measure of whether something is ingrained or not under Ju~ 
Campbell's view probably would be the judge's subjective experi- ~~ 
~-
This makes the ingrained-in-our-culture test virtually  ence. _.. 
~ 
standardless, and this is the second major problem with promul-
gating such a test. Judge Campbell appears to have thought it 
self-evident that creches were routinely part of government-
sponsored Christmas but that public masses were not. As I have 
said, my experience would suggest they both should be barred. I 
suspect that one who had grown up in Catholic New Mexico might 
not find a government-sponsored Easter or Christmas service so 
unusual. Even granting that two judges can agree that a certain 
governmental religious practice is not utterly unprecedented, 
moreover, how long something must be practiced and how widely are 
entirely up to the judge. Would the twenty years that a cross 
was erected in Black Rock Mountain State Park be enough? See 
Radun County Chamber of Commerce, 698 F.2d, at 1101. In sum, I 
~ 
·. 
believe the purpose-effect-entanglement test of Lemon provided a 
more concrete standard and, more important, was more soundly 
based in experience. 
A third problem with the view of the SG and the dissent is 
that it inevitably furthers only the majority religion. It fur-
ther entrenches the entrenched establishment; which is precisely 
what the Establishment Clause should guard against. ~ 1 __ -~ A~ '~- ? 
None of these objections to an ingrained-in-our-culture test 
is altered by the argument that Christ is essential to Christmas. 
(I disagree with the this statement as a matter of fact, see 
supra page 9-10 and infra this page.) First, there is no evi-
dence that government nationally or generally publicly celebrates 
the Christian nature of Christmas. I suspect that Christmas cel-
ebration by the government is historically as nondenominational 
as possible because of the political considerations noted above. 
Second, as a result, whether any particular government recogni-
tion of the Christian nature of the holiday is ingrained in our 
culture would depend entirely on the judge's subjective experi-
ence or on local practice. Third, it is precisely in celebrating 
the most traditional holidays of the majority that the danger of 
establishment is greatest. (Allowing the government to use 
clearly nonreligious symbols such as Santa Claus does not raise 
similar problems. The Marsh-type test is only applicable if the 
government practice would be an advancement of religion under 
Lemon.) 
I do not see the need for sanctioning this expansion of gov-





lar sects. To limit government to celebrating the secular side 
of Christmas does not make the holiday an empty or tasteless ges-
ture. The fact is that millions of people celebrate the holiday 
without any reference to its religious roots. Moreover, that is 
how the other major non-church celebrator of Christmas approaches 
the holiday. Commerce avoids reference to particular religious 
sects because it does not wish to offend anyone. For government 
to be relegated to the same role is perfectly proper, for it 
should be as zealous in seeking to avoid alienating minorities 
among its constituents. The SG' s argument that to so require 
would be to show hostility to religion and establish a religion 
of secularism has been rejected by this Court. Only "affirma-
tively opposing or showing hostility to religion" will raise con-
cern in this area. Abington, 374 u.s., at 225. Essentially, the 
presumption of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is 
that government neutrality is best ensured by government secular-
ism. 
Finally, I would emphasize that all that is involved in this 
case is what the government can and cannot do by way of promoting 
religion. I argue primarily that allowing it to advance~ given J5Ltj$" 
~ religion, even {or especially) in a traditional setting, rather 
than merely advancing 
contrary to the wise teachings of history and case law. This 
does not mean, of course, that churches, merchants associations, 
and civic groups could not use the same park to erect a creche. 
The distinction is technical but important, because government 
sponsorship uniquely tends to inhibit the "free competition" 
..... 
among sects that was desired by the Framers. This--that govern-
ment sponsorship is different and more dangerous than mere major-
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World . Christmas has roots that are embedded deeply in the 
Christian_. religion; its roots also extend to folk customs and 
pagan rites that predate the birth of Christ. 
The creche, however, is tied firmly to the Christian religion; 
it tells the story of the birth of Christ, the Son of God. Unlike 
today's Christmas holiday, the creche is not the result of the 
combination of folk culture and tradition. The creche is purely 
a Christian religious symbol; this is the distinction between the 
creche and Christmas as a holiday. It is a distinction of con-
stitutional significance. Although the government may . 
recognize Christmas as a holiday and even participate in some 
of its secular traditions, it may not participate in or promote 
the Christian celebration of Christmas. To view the creche as 
only one of the many symbols of the Christmas holiday season 
is to denigrate its religious significance and misinterpret the 
historical background of Christmas. 
CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge (Dissenting). As the nativity scene 
is IlrototYJ.llc~~as-and as Christmas is 
itself a legal holiday whose constitutionality is not here ques-
tioned- ! think the court errs in holding that the display in a 
public park ~istma~ season of characters and 
animals associated with that scene constitutes "an establish-
ment of religion" within the first amendment. Unassociated, ~,_;..J/l' 
as they were, with the performance of any religious rites, the ~ 
fig_ures did not "establish" religion in the context in which they ,y-t-
were presented. They simply contributed to the message that 
the holiday they represented was at hand. 
It must be borne in mind that this creche was but part of a ~ 
l~ay in the same location which included a talking .;-
wishing well, a Santa's house inhabited by a live Santa who ~ 
distributed candy, trees of various sizes, reindeer, and 21 . 
cutout figures including a clown, dancing elephant, robot and ~~ 
·. 
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teddy bear. The whole melange, including the creche, was 
nothing more nor~ potpourri of well-recognized 
Christmas symbols. Had a solitary creche been displayed in 
July, one might see it as designed to serve chiefly religious 
ends, since there would then be no holiday with which it was 
particularly identified. But creches and Santas in December J t1J'A-
are as typically symbolic of Christmas as turkeys and Pilgrims 1 
in November are symbolic of Thanksgiving. 
The root of the difficulty lies in the fact that Christmas 
originated as, and to some people continues to be, a religious 
holiday. 1 For that reason certain of its established symbols 
relate to myths bearing, for some, a religious meaning. In 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Christmas is 
defined as follows: 
An annual church festival kept on December 25 or by the 
Armenians on January 6 in memory of the birth of Christ, 
celebrated generally by a particular church service, 
special gifts and greetings, and observed in most Chris-
tian communities as a legal holiday. 
I 
Because Christmas memorializes the founder of Christianity 
and is a church festival, it might be argued that t e state and 
national governments should not be allowed to recognize it at 
all. Such an argument-unlike, I submit, the court's present 
_.--:;:,~p--=o...::s_it....:.i..:..o\ -would at least be logically consistent. In my opin-
ion, t e two most logically consistent positions are as follows: 
either Christmas itself, because of its inextricably intertwined 
~ religious roots, cannot constitutionally be a national holiday, 
Q..UU1.v1J--t;' which case displays of the type here in issue would also be 
~ unconstitutional; or else Christmas is constitutional, in which 
~ ... case all its relevant symbols, including those depicting the 
~~.-¥~ 
.{;..v 0./ 1 I do not disagree with Judge Bownes that modern Christmas has many 
/j , , .....1,1---'--A ecular and pagan aspects besides. My point is not that symbols portraying 
.J,t.£J-/.A/ f' , t~eJ:>irth of Christ are the exclusive symbols of the season; far from it. My 
/)A..LJ.-j;_..-f'l'<{/oi'nt is merely that such symbols are clearly and inescapably a part of the 
1J~~-ral symbolism of the holiday, and therefore cannot be deleted without 
~....1--P:... • eommitting an act of censorship against the holiday itself. 
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nativity, are likewise constitutional, so long as displayed for 
the pu!pose of announcing the holiday. 
No one has argued in this case that Christmas as a national 
holiday is itself unconstitutional. Chief Judge Pettine, it is ,1) c_ 
true, wrote in his opinion below that if the creche is not 
declared unconstitutional, then Christmas itself might have to 
be declared unconstitutional. He would thus "save" Christmas 
by shearing it of all its religious trappings. This is a possible ap-
proach, but I wonder if it really works. It seems a little like 
maintaining a holiday known as "Washington's Birthday" 
while extirpating all reference to George Washington. 
Christ~s, so long ~ailed by that name, inescapably recalls tJ-/-
the birth of the founder of Christianity. To "save" it by pre-~ 
tending to the contrary has an almost Orwellian twist. I do not 
think constitutional values are furthered by this kind of think-
ing. 
The fact is, Christmas, with its clear religious as well as its 
secular roots, has become an ingrained part of our culture. 
Were one today to seek to make a national holiday out of such 
a church festival, constitutional objections might well prevail. 
But Christmas is water over the dam. And so, I would argue, 
are all its established symbols, including carols and creches. To 
retain the holiday but outlaw these ancient symbols seems to 
me an empty and even rather boorish gesture. 2 If creches are 
to be outlawed, so too should stars and carols. And surely, the 
name itself-Christmas, deriving from "Christ" and 
"mass" -should be the first to go if the Constitution requires 
the eradication of any and all religious connotations! 
I think we should accept what seems obvious-that, for/ 
historic regsQ.!)s, Christmas is a constitutionally valid p;;tof 4~ 
our national life. In having so become, it allows like any holi- I 
~
day the display of its accepted symbols-that and no more. To 
the extent these carry religio·us as well as mythical connota-
tions, they must when placed on public property, be shown in 
2 Although no more boorish, perhaps, than the City of Cranston's argu-
ment that the real purpose of the creche was to bring shoppers to town. 
· .. 
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a manner limited to announcement of the holiday rather than 
of a _religious celebration or the inculcation of religion. The 
first 'amendment would plainly not allow the city to pay for a 
Christmas mass in a public park or the like. But the nativity 
scene has merged into the accepted Christmas symbolism. 
When seasonally · deployed without accompanying religious 
ceremonies or message, I do not think it can be said to establish 
religion, any more than would the piping in of carols or similar 
activities having a religious base which our society has come to 
accept as part and parcel of the Christmas season. 
I would uphold the constitutionality of the Rhode Island 
display and reverse the decision below. 
-~ 
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From: The Chief Justice 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1256 
DENNIS LYNCH, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
DANIEL DONNELLY ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1983] 
THE CHIEF JuSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality 
from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual 
Christmas display. 
I 
Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail mer-
chants' association, the City of Pawtucket, R. I., erects a 
Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas 
holiday season. In recent years, the display has been lo-
cated in Hodgson Park, a private park owned by a nonprofit 
organization in the heart of the City's shopping district. The 
display is essentially like those to be found in hundreds of 
towns or cities across the Nation-often on public grounds-
during the Christmas season. The Pawtucket display is 
comprised of many of the figures and decorations tradition-
ally associated with Christmas, including, among other 
things, a Santa Claus' house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, 
candy-striped poles, cutout figures representing such char-
acters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds 
of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS 
GREETINGS," and the creche at issue here. All compo-
nents of this display are owned by the City. 
The creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or 
more years, occupies about 140 square feet of the 40,000 
·f .. 
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square feet of the park. The figures in the creche, which 
range from 5" to 5' in height, include the infant, Mary and 
Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals. In 1973, 
when the present creche was acquired, it cost the City $1365; 
it now is valued at $200. The erection and dismantling of the 
creche costs the City about $20 per year; nominal expenses 
are incurred in lighting the creche. No money has been ex-
pended on maintenance of the creche for the past 10 years. 
Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual mem-
bers of the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, and the Union itself, brought this action in the 
United States District Court for Rhode Island, challenging 
the City's inclusion of the creche in the annual display. The 
District Court held that the City's inclusion of the creche 
in the display violated the Establishment Clause, which is 
binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D. R. I. 1981). The 
District Court held that, by including the creche in the 
Christmas display, the City has "tried to endorse and pro-
mulgate [religious] beliefs," 525 F. Supp., at 1173, and that 
"erection of the creche has the real and substantial effect of 
affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche 
represents." I d., at 1177. This "appearance of official 
sponsorship," it found, "confers more than a remote and inci-
dental benefit on Christianity." I d., at 1178. Last, al-
though the court acknowledged the absence of administrative 
entanglement, it found that excessive entanglement had been 
fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including 
the creche in the celebration. Id., at 1179-1180. Petitioner 
was permanently enjoined from including the creche in the 
display. 
A divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F. 2d 1029 (1982). We 
granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1983). We reverse. 





Purpose ofthe Establishment Clause 
3 
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is, 
"to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either 
[the church or the state] into the precincts of the other." 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 614 (1970). 
At the same time, however, the Court reminded that, 
"total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. 
Some relationship between government and religious 
organizations is inevitable." Ibid. 
An Establishment Clause challenge must be examined in 
light of these principles. 
The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses 
as erecting a "wall" between church and state, see, e. g., 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). The 
concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech 
probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. 1 The 
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment 
Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching 
it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate descrip-
tion of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact ex-
ists between church and state. 
No significant segment of our society and no institution 
within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation 
from all the other parts, much less from government. "It 
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce 
a regime of total separation .... " Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
760 (1973). And the Constitution does not require complete 
1 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878) 
(quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the 
Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802)) . 
... ., ... 
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separation; it mandates tolerance of all religions, and forbids 
hostility toward any. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U. S. 306, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 
U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require the "cal-
lous indifference" that we have said is not intended by the 
Establishment Clause. Zorach, supra, at 314. Indeed, we 
have observed that such hostility would bring us into "war 
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion." McCol-
lum, supra, at 211-212. 
B 
Contemporaneous Understanding of 
the Establishment Clause 
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause has 
comported with what history reveals was the contemporane-
ous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example 
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is 
found in the events of the fust week of the First Session of 
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress 
approved the Establishment Clause, as part of the Bill of 
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation 
providing for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In 
Marsh v. Chambers, -- U. S. -- (1983), we noted that 
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention where the subjects of 
freedom of speech, press and religion and antagonism toward 
an established church were under constant discussion. In 
Marsh we held that there was no conflict with the Estab-
lishment Clause when Nebraska employed members of the 
clergy as official Legislative Chaplains to give opening pray-
ers at sessions of the State Legislature. 
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Con-
gress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the 
Court's statement that the First Congress, 
"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have al-
ways been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of 
82-1256---0PINION -
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the greatest weight in the interpretation of that funda-
mental document," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 
174-175 (1926) 
It is clear beyond doubt that neither the draftsmen of the 
Constitution who were Members of the First Congress, or 
the Congress of 1789, saw any Establishment problem in the 
employment of Congressional Chaplains to offer daily pray-
ers in the Congress, and that practice has continued to the 
present day. c 
Historical Background 
There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by 
all three branches of government of the role of religion in 
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in the opinions of 
this Court was this more clearly and eloquently expressed 
than in the statement of Justice Douglas speaking for the 
Court in the opinion validating a program allowing release of 
public school students from classes to attend off-campus reli-
gious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated 
the Establishment Clause, the Court stated: 
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 
315 (1952). 
Our history is replete with official references to the value 
and need for Divine guidance and they are found repeatedly 
in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fa-
thers as well as contemporary leaders. Beginning in the 
early colonial period long before Independence, a day of 
Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to give 
thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God. Presi-
dent Washington and his successors have proclaimed Thanks-
giving Day, with all its religious overtones 2 and Congress 
' The day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged 
President Washington to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and 
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many 
- 82-125~0PINION 6 LYNCH v. DONNELLY 
made it a National Holiday. 5 U. S. C. § 6103(a) (1982). 
With the passage of time, that Holiday like Christmas has 
taken on more and more a secular cast, but it has not lost its 
theme of expressing thanks for Divine aid. 3 
Executive orders and other official announcements of Pres-
idents and of the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas 
and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms. 
And, by acts of Congress, it has long been the practice that 
federal employees are released from duties on these National 
Holidays, while being paid from the same public revenues 
that provide the compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate 
and the House and the military. Thus, it is clear that gov-
ernment has long recognized-indeed it has subsidized-holi-
days with religious significance not fundamentally different 
from the creche challenged here. 
Other examples of religious references are found in the 
statutorily prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," 36 
and signal favours of Almighty God." See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church 
and State in the United States 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964). President Washing-
ton proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to "offer[] our 
prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and 
beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions .. .. " 1 
J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents 1789-1897 64 (1899). 
Presidents Adams and Madison also issued thanksgiving proclamations, 
as have almost all our presidents, see 3 A. Stokes, Church and State in the 
United States 180-193 (1950), through the incumbent, see Proclamation 
No. 4883, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,153 (1981). 
' An example is found in President Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of 
Thanksgiving: 
"[l]t is fitting that we give thanks with special fervor to our Heavenly 
Father for the mercies we have received individually and as a nation and 
for the blessings He has restored, through the victories of our arms and 
those of our Allies, to His children in other lands. 
* * * 
To the end that we may bear more earnest witness to our gratitude to 
Almighty God, I suggest a nationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures dur-
ing the period from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas." Proclamation No. 
2629, 9 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1944). 
. . 
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U. S. C. § 186 (1976), which Congress and the President 
mandated for our currency, see 31 U.S. C. §324 (1976); and 
in the language "One nation under God," as part of the Pledge 
of Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by 
countless thousands of public school children-and adults-
every year. Other official acknowledgments of our religious 
history are readily found. 4 
Art galleries supported by public revenues display reli-
gious paintings of the 15th and 16th Centuries, predomi-
nantly inspired by one religious faith; the National Gallery in 
Washington, for example, has long exhibited masterpieces 
with religious messages, notably Dali's Last Supper, and nu-
merous paintings depicting the birth of Christ, the Cruci-
fixion and the Resurrection, among many other paintings 
with Christian themes and messages. 5 The very chamber in 
which oral arguments on this case were heard is decorated 
with a notable and permanent-not seasonal-symbol of reli-
gion: Moses with Ten Commandments. Congress has long 
provided chapels in the Capitol for religious worship and 
meditation. 
These are but a few illustrations of government acknowl-
edgment of our religious heritage. One cannot look at even a 
'On the urging of Congress, Pub. L. No. 97-280, 96 Stat. 1211, Presi-
dent Reagan proclaimed 1983 the " 'Year of the Bible' in recognition of both 
the formative influence the Bible has been for our Nation, and our national 
need to study and apply the teachings of the Holy Scriptures." Proclama-
tion No. 5018, 48 Fed. Reg. 5527 (1983). 
Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of 
Prayer each year "on which the people of the United States may turn to 
God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals." 
36 U. S. C. § 169h (1976). Our presidents have repeatedly issued such 
proclamations. See, e. g. , Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261 
(1983); Proclamation No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation 
No. 4379, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087, 36 Fed. Reg. 
19,961 (1971); Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proc-
lamation No. 3501, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962). 
• The National Gallery currently exhibits more than 200 similar religious 
paintings . 
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brief resume of those relationships without finding that our 
history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs such as 
Justice Douglas expressed in Z orach, supra. Equally per-
vasive is the concept of tolerance of all faiths, and all forms of 
religious expression. 6 
This history may help explain why the Court consistently 
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establish-
ment Clause. We have refused "to construe the Religion 
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate 
constitutional objectives as illuminated by history." Walz 
v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis 
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions 
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage di-
versity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in 
applying the Establishment Clause to religious expression is 
simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court. 
D 
Judicial Scrutiny Under The Clause 
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental 
conduct or statutes that confer benefits on religion-as an ab-
solutist approach would dictate-the Court has scrutinized 
challenged legislation or official conduct to determine 
whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, 
or tends to do so. See Walz, supra, at 669. This approach 
is consistent with what Joseph Story wrote a century and a 
half ago: 
"The real object of the First Amendment was ... to pre-
vent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which 
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of 
the national government." 3 Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States 1871 (1833). 
6 Presidential proclamations and messages have issued to commemorate 
Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No. 4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077 
(1981), and the Jewish High Holy Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058 
(Sept. 29, 1981). 
82--1256-0PINION 
LYNCH v. DONNELLY 9 
In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing and no fixed, 
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like 
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed section of a 
legal code capable of mechanical application. The purpose of 
the Clause "was to state an objective, not to write a statute." 
Walz, supra, at 668. The Clause does not provide a defini-
tion of an established church or religion but the draftsmen 
and their contemporaries knew well what it was. 
The line between permissible relationships and those 
barred by the Clause can no more be straight and unwaver-
ing than due process can be defined in a single stroke or 
phrase or test. The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, [a] 
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a par-
ticular relationship." Lemon, supra, at 614. 
In the line-drawing process we have at times found it use-
ful to inquire (a) whether the challenged law or conduct has a 
secular purpose; (b) whether its principal or primary effect 
advances or inhibits religion; and (c) whether it creates an 
excessive entanglement of government with religion. For 
present purposes, the focus of the inquiry must be on the 
creche in the context of the entire Christmas display, not on 
the creche in isolation. See e. g. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 
39 (1980) (per curiam); Abingdon School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). 
In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state statute re-
quiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on 
public classroom walls. But the Court carefully pointed out 
that the Commandments were posted as a religious admoni-
tion, rather than being "integrated into the school curricu-
lum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an ap-
propriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative 
religion, or the like." 449 U. S., at 42. Similarly, in 
Abingdon, although the Court struck down the practices in 
two states requiring daily Bible readings in public schools, it 
specifically noted that nothing in the Court's holding was in-
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gion, when presented objectively as part of a secular pro-
gram of education, may not be effected consistently with the 
First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225. 
(a) Here the District Court found that the inclusion of the 
creche had no secular purpose, and in so doing it rejected the 
City's claim that its reasons for including the creche were es-
sentially the same as its reason for sponsoring the display as 
a whole. The creche, which is a very small part of the total, 
simply depicts the historical origins and traditional elements 
of Christmas as part of the occasion that has long been recog-
nized as a legal Holiday. The City's purposes are broad and 
general. In part it seeks to attract people to the downtown 
commercial area in a continuing effort to promote retail sales 
for the merchants. At the same time it goes beyond the 
commercial aspect and seeks to engender a friendly commu-
nity spirit for the celebration of the Holiday, perhaps divert-
ing focus from less pleasant events. 
In celebrating holidays or other popular events, a commu-
nity objective may be stimulation of patriotism, or commu-
nity pride and loyalty. It may seek to honor a football team, 
a golf champion, a political or public leader, or a returning as-
tronaut. Whatever the occasion, the sentiments are not nec-
essarily shared by 100 percent of the community. Those 
who do not agree, those who are indifferent, even those who 
are opposed, are free to ignore the occasion. Nothing is I 
forced on them in these situations and nothing is forced on 
the observers of the display in Pawtucket. 
The Court has invoked the Establishment Clause to invali-
date legislation or governmental action on the ground that 
secular purpose was lacking, but it has done this only when 
there was no question that the statute or activity was pre-
dominantly motivated by religious considerations. See, 
e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 
U. S. 97 (1968); Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Even where the bene-
fit to religion is substantial, as with the exemption of 
, .. 
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churches from taxation, we saw no conflict with the Estab-
lishment Clause; history was an important factor in the 
Court's holding in Walz, supra. 
There is no evidence in this case to suggest that the inclu-
sion of the creche was a purposeful or surreptitious effort to 
express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy or en-
dorsement of religion or a particular religious message. The 
City, like the Congress and Presidents, has simply taken 
note of a significant historical event long celebrated in the 
Western world. The creche is "simply one of a group of ob-
jects assembled to show how the American people celebrate 
the holiday season surrounding Christmas." See Allen v. 
HjPkel, 424 F. 2d 944, 949 (CADC 1970). 
v Chief Judge Campbell's cogent observations in dissent in 
the Court of Appeals reflect the secular purpose of the dis-
play in promoting a spirit of tolerance and accommodation: 
"The whole melange, including the creche, was nothing 
more nor less than a potpourri of well-recognized Christ-
mas symbols. Had a solitary creche been displayed in 
July, one might see it as designed to serve chiefly reli-
gious ends, since there would then be no holiday with 
which it was particularly identified. But creches and 
Santas in December are as typically symbolic of Christ-
mas as turkeys and Pilgrims in November are symbolic 
of Thanksgiving." 525 F. Supp., at 1037-1038. 
The real question is whether, taken as a whole, including the 
creche, the display is so devoid of secular purpose that it vio-
lates the Establishment Clause and must be suppressed. On 
this record we hold that the purpose of the challenged display 
as a whole is secular. 
(b) The District Court found that the primary effect of in-
clusion of the creche is to advance religion. Comparisons of 
the relative benefits to religion of different forms of support 
are elusive and difficult to make. But to conclude that the 
primary effect of the creche in this display represents a sig-
nificant and thus impermissible benefit would require that we 
' .• 
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view it as more beneficial to religion, for example, than the 
expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks sup-
plied throughout the country to church-sponsored schools, 
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); 7 the ex-
penditure of public funds for transportation of students at-
tending church-sponsored schools, Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, supra; 8 the Federal grants for college buildings of 
church-sponsored institutions of higher education which are a 
part of an institutional complex combining secular and reli-
gious education, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971); 
the noncategorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and 
universities, Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U. S. 
736 (1976); the tax exemption for church properties sanc-
tioned in Walz, supra; or the Sunday closing laws upheld in 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). 9 We are 
unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving from the 
creche than from these benefits previously approved. What 
was said about the legislative prayers in Marsh, supra, at 
--, and implied about the Sunday Closing Laws in 
McGowan is true of the City's inclusion of the creche: its 
"reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize 
with the tenets of some . . . religions." See McGowan, 
supra, at 442. 
The Court has made it abundantly clear that "not every 
law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit 
upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally 
invalid." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra. Here, given the context in which the creche is dis-
7 The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely 
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school." 392 U. S., at 244. 
8 In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "some children might not be 
sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their chil-
dren's bus fares . . . " 330 U. S., at 17. 
9 "ln McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained 
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat 
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions an~ even at-
tend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776. 
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played, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all reli-
gions, is indirect, remote and incidental; the primary effect of 
the creche no more advances religion than the Congressional 
and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself 
as "Christ's Mass." 
(c) The District Court found that there had been no admin-
istrative entanglement between religion and state resulting 
from the City's ownership and use of the creche. 525 F. 
Supp., at 1179. But it went on to hold that some political 
divisiveness was engendered by this litigation. Coupled 
with an impermissible sectarian purpose and effect, this per-
suaded the court that there was "excessive entanglement." 
The Court of Appeals expressly declined to accept the Dis-
trict Court's finding that inclusion of the creche has caused 
political divisiveness, and noted that this Court has never 
held that the potential for political divisiveness alone was suf-
ficient to invalidate government conduct. 
Entanglement is a question of kind and degree. Here 
there was no evidence of contact with church authorities con-
cerning the content of the exhibit prior to or since the City's 
purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of 
the creche have been necessary; and since the City owns the 
creche, now valued at $200.00, the tangible material it con-
tributes is de minimis. Nor does the display implicate any 
ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state. 
There is here nothing like the continuing involvement 
present in Nyquist, supra; Lemon, supra; and Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472 (1973). 
Apart from this litigation there is no evidence of political I 
friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history 
of the Christmas celebration apart from this litigation. Par-
adoxically, given its intimation of divisiveness, the District 
Court stated that the inclusion of the creche for 40 years nad 
be~ed by no apparent dissension" and that the dis-
play has had a "calm history." 525 F. Supp., at 1179. Re-
spondents cannot by the very act of commencing this lawsuit 
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create a situation of divisiveness and then proceed to exploit 
it as evidence. 
We are satisfied that the City's primary purpose in includ-
ing the creche is secular, not sectarian, that it does not im-
permissibly advance religion, and that it does not create ex-
cessive entanglement between religion and government. 
E 
A creche, like a painting, is passive; in this context it is a 
reminder of the origins of Christmas. Of course it is identi-
fied with a religious faith but no more so than the examples 
we have set out from prior cases in which we found no conflict 
with the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., McGowan, 
supra; Marsh, supra. The creche may well have special 
meaning to those whose faith includes the celebration of reli-
gious masses, but none who sense the origins of the Christ-
mas celebration would fail to be aware of its religious implica-
tions. Even the traditional, purely secular displays extant 
at Christmas, with or without a creche, would inevitably re-
call those religious implications. 
To compel the removal of this one passive symbol-the 
creche-from a display at the very time people are taking 
note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in public 
schools and other public places would be a stilted over-reac-
tion contrary to our history and our holdings. If the pres-
ence of the creche in this display violates the Establishment 
Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christ-
mas are equally offensive to the Constitution; and it would 
mean that we wrongly decided a long line of cases. 
In Everson, supra, the Court recognized that the "fears 
and political problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses 
in the 18th century are of less concern in the present day. 
330 U. S., at 8. It would be ironic if the inclusion of a single 
symbol of a particular historic religious event, as part of a 
celebration acknowledged in the Western world for 20 centu-
ries, and in this country by the people, by the Executive 
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Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two centuries, 
would so "taint" the whole exhibit as to make it violative of 
the Establishment Clause. 
We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
the Vicar of Rome or other powerful religious leaders behind 
every acknowledgment of the religious symbols which have 
long been officially recognized by the three constitutional 
branches of government. In short, any notion that these 
symbols of Christmas pose a real danger of establishment of a 
state church is farfetched indeed. 
F 
That this Court has been alert to the constitutionally ex-
pressed opposition to the establishment of religion is shown 
in numerous holdings. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra; 
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Epperson v. 
Arkansas, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra; and McCollum v. 
Board of Education, supra. The most recent example is 
found in the case invalidating a municipal ordinance granting 
to a church a virtual veto power over the licensing of liquor 
establishments near a church. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 
-- U. S. -- (1983). Taken together these cases abun-
dantly demonstrate the Court's concern to protect the genu-
ine objectives of the Establishment Clause. It is far too late 
in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the Establishment 
Clause on the country. 
III 
We hold that the challenged program of the City of Paw-
tucket does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment ofthe Court of Ap-
peals is reversed. 
Reversed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1256 
DENNIS LYNCH, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
DANIEL DONNELLY ET AL. 
I 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1983] 
THE CHIEF JuSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality 
from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual 
Christmas display. 
I 
Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail mer-
chants' association, the City of Pawtucket, R. I., erects a 
Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas 
holiday season. The display is situated in a park owned by a 
nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the shop-
ping district. The display is essentially like those to be 
found in hundreds of towns or cities across the Nation-often 
on public grounds-during the Christmas season. The Paw-
tucket display is comprised of many of the figures and decora-
tions traditionally associated with Christmas, including, 
among other things, a Santa Claus' house, reindeer pulling 
Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, cutout figures represent-
ing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, 
hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEA-
SONS GREETINGS," and the creche at issue here. All 
components of this display are owned by the City. 
The creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or 
more years, occupies about 140 iquare feet of the 40,000 
square feet of the whole area. ; rhe figures in the creche, 
/~e c..ha.~~t-(U ke. tJ..rL .ftt;,.l7 N'r~ .,,ttf, 7A.e.7 r£f ~ a st"c;-• -h~ 
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which range from 5" to 5' in height, include the Infant Jesus, 
Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals. In 
1973, when the present creche was acquired, it cost the City 
$1365; 'it now is valued at $200. The erection and disman-
tling of the creche costs the City about $20 per year; nominal 
expenses are incurred in lighting the creche. No money has 
been expended on maintenance of the creche for the past 10 
years. 
Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual mem-
bers of the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, and the Union itself, brought this action in the 
United States District Court for Rhode Island, challenging 
the City's inclusion of the creche in the annual display. The 
District Court held that the City's inclusion of the creche 
in the display violated the Establishment Clause, which is 
binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D. R. I. 1981). The 
District Court held that, by including the creche in the 
Christmas display, the City has ''tried to endorse and pro-
mulgate [religious] beliefs," 525 F. Supp., at 1173, and that 
"erection of the creche has the real and substantial effect of 
affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche 
represents." I d., at 1177. This "appearance of official 
sponsorship," it held, "confers more than a remote and inci-
dental benefit on Christianity." Id., at 1178. Last, al-
though the court acknowledged the absence of administrative 
entanglement, it found that excessive entanglement had been 
fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including 
the creche in the celebration. Id., at 1179-1180. Petitioner 
was permanently enjoined from including the creche in the 
display. 
A divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F. 2d 1029 (1982). We 
granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1983). We reverse. 
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II 
A 
Purpose of the Establishment Clause 
3 
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establish-
ment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is, 
''to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either 
[the church or the state] into the precincts of the other." 
Lerrwn v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1970). 
At the same time, however, the Court reminded that, 
''total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. 
Some relationship between government and religious 
organizations is inevitable." Ibid. 
An Establishment Clause challenge must be examined in 
light of these principles. 
The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses 
as erecting a ''wall" between church and state, see, e. g., 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). The 
concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech 
probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. 1 The 
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment 
Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching 
it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate descrip-
tion of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact ex-
ists between church and state. 
No significant segment of our society and no institution 
within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation 
from all the other parts, much less from government. "It 
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce 
a regime of total separation .... " Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
760 (1973). And the Constitution does not require complete 
'See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878) 
(quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the 
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separation; it mandates tolerance of all religions, and forbids 
hostility toward any. See, .e. g.J Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U. S. 306, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 
U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require the "cal-
lous indifference" that we have said is not intended by the 
Establishment Clause. Zorach, supra, at 314. Indeed, we 
have observed that such hostility would bring us into "war 
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion." McCol-
lum, supra, at 211-212. 
B 
Contemporaneous Understanding of 
the Establishment Clause 
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause has 
comported with what history reveals was the contemporane-
ous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example 
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is 
found in the events of the first week of the First Session of 
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress 
approved the Establishment Clause, as part of the Bill of 
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation 
providing for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In 
Marsh v. Chambers, -- U. S. -- (1983), we noted that 
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention where the subjects of 
freedom of speech, press and religion and antagonism toward 
an established church were under constant discussion. In 
Marsh we held that there was no conflict with the Estab-
lishment Clause when Nebraska employed members of the 
clergy as official Legislative Chaplains to give opening pray-
ers at sessions of the State Legislature. 
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Con-
gress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the 
Court's statement that the First Congress, 
"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have al-
ways been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of 
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the greatest weight in the interpretation of that funda-
mental document," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 
174-175 (1926) . . 
It is clear beyond doubt that neither the draftsmen of the 
Constitution who were Members of the First Congress, or 
the Congress of 1789, saw any Establishment problem in the 
employment of Congressional Chaplains to offer daily pray-
ers in the Congress, and that practice has continued to the 
present day. It would be difficult to identify a more striking 




There is an unbroken history of official aclmowledgment by 
all three branches of government of the role of religion in 
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in the opinions of 
this Court was this more affirmatively expressed than in the 
statement of Justice Douglas speaking for the Court in the 
opinion validating a program allowing release of public school 
students from classes to attend off-campus religious exer-
cises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated the 
Establishment Clause, the Court stated: 
''We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 
315 (1952). 
Our history is replete with official references to the value 
and need for Divine guidance and they are found repeatedly 
in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fa-
thers as well as contemporary leaders. Beginning in the 
early colonial period long before Independence, a day of 
Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to give 
thanks for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God. Presi-
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giving Day, with all its religious overtones 2 and Congress 
made it a National Holiday. 5 U. S. C. § 6103(a) (1982). 
With the passage of time, that Holiday like Christmas has 
taken on more and more a secular cast, but it has not lost its 
theme of expressing thanks for Divine aid. 8 
Executive orders and other official announcements of Pres-
idents and of the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas 
and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms. 
And, by acts of Congress, it has long been the practice that 
1 The day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged 
President Washington to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and 
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many 
and signal favours of Almighty God." See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church 
and State in the United States 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964). President Washing-
ton proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to "offer{] our 
prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and 
beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions. . . . " 1 
J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents 1789-1897 64 (1899). 
Presidents Adams and Madison also issued thanksgiving proclamations, 
as have almost all our presidents, see 3 A. Stokes, Church and State in the 
United States 180-193 (1950), through the incumbent, see Proclamation 
No. 4883, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,153 (1981). 
1 An example is found in President Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of 
Thanksgiving: 
"[l)t is fitting that we give thanks with special fervor to our Heavenly 
Father for the mercies we have received individually and as a nation and 
for the blessings He has restored, through the victories of our arms and 
those of our Allies, to His children in other lands. 
• • • 
To the end that we may bear more earnest witness to our gratitude to 
Almighty God, I suggest a nationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures dur-
ing the period from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas." Proclamation No. 
2629, 9 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1944). 
President Reagan and his immediate predecessors have issued similar 
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5098, 48 Fed. Reg. 42,801 
(1983); Proclamation No. 4803, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,633 (1980); Proclamation 
No. 4333,39 Fed. Reg. 40,003 (1974); Proclamation No. 4093,36 Fed. Reg. 
21,401 (1971); Proclamation No. 3752, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,635 (1966); Proc-
lamation No. 3560, 28 Fed. Reg. 11,871 (1963). 
. ' 
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federal employees are released from duties on these National 
Holidays, while being paid from the same public revenues 
that provide the compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate 
and the House and the military. Thus, it is clear that gov-
ernment has long recognized-indeed it has subsidized-holi-
days with religious significance not fundamentally different 
from the creche challenged here. 
Other examples of religious references are found in the 
statutorily prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," 36 
U. S. C. § 186 (1976), which Congress and the President 
mandated for our currency, see 31 U. S. C. § 324 (1976); and 
in the language "One nation under God," as part of the Pledge 
of Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by 
countless thousands of public school children-and adults-
every year. Other official acknowledgments of our religious 
history are readily found. 4 
Art galleries supported by public revenues display reli-
gious paintings of the 15th and 16th Centuries, predomi-
nantly inspired by one religious faith; the National Gallery in 
Washington, for example, has long exhibited masterpieces 
with religious messages, notably the Last Supper, and paint-
ings depicting the Birth of Christ, the Crucifixion, and the 
Resurrection, among many others with Christian themes and 
• Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of 
Prayer each year "on which the people of the United States may turn to 
God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals." 
36 U. S. C. § 169h (1976). Our presidents have repeatedly issued such 
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261 
(1983); Proclamation No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation 
No. 4379,40 Fed. Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087,36 Fed. Reg. 
19,961 (1971); Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proc-
lamation No. 3501, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962). 
Presidential proclamations and messages have issued to commemorate 
Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No. 4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077 
(1981), and the Jewish High Holy Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058 
(Sept. 29, 1981). 
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messages. 5 The very chamber in which oral arguments on 
this case were heard is decorated with a notable and perma-
nent-not seasonal-symbol of religion: Moses with Ten 
Commandments. Congress has long provided chapels in the 
Capitol for religious worship and meditation. 
These are but a few illustrations of government acknowl-
edgment of our religious heritage. One cannot look at even a 
brief resume of those relationships without finding that our 
history is pervaded by expressions of religious beliefs such as 
Justice Douglas expressed in Z O'T'aCh, supra. Equally per-
vasive is the concept of tolerance of all faiths, and all forms of 
religious expression. 
D 
Judicial Scrutiny Under The Clause 
This history may help explain why the Court consistently 
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establish-
ment Clause. We have refused ''to construe the Religion 
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate 
constitutional objectives as illuminated by history." Walz 
v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis 
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions 
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage di-
versity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in 
applying the Establishment Clause to religious expression is 
simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court. 
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental 
conduct or statutes that confer benefits on religion-as an ab-
solutist approach would dictate-the Court has scrutinized 
challenged legislation or official conduct to determine 
whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, 
or tends to do so. See Walz, supra, at 669. This approach 
is consistent with what Joseph Story wrote a century and a 
half ago: 
5 The National Gallery currently exhibits more than 200 similar religious 
paintings. 
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"The real object of the First Amendment was . . . to pre-
vent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which 
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of 
the national government/' 3 Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States 1871 (1833). 
In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, 
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like 
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed paragraph 
in a legal code capable of mechanical application. The pur-
pose of the Establishment Clause ''was to state an objective, 
not to write a statute." Walz, supra, at 668. The line be-
tween permissible relationships and those barred by the 
Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due 
process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test. 
The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, [a] variable barrier 
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
ship.,. Lemon, supra, at 614. 
In the line-drawing process we have at times found it use-
ful to inquire (a) whether the challenged law or conduct has a 
secular purpose; (b) whether its principal or primary effect 
advances or inhibits religion; and (c) whether it creates an 
excessive entanglement of government with religion. For 
present purposes, the focus of the inquiry must be on the 
creche in the context of the entire Christmas display, not 
on the creche in isolation. See e. g. Stone v. Graham, 449 
U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Abingdon School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). 
In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state statute re-
quiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on 
public classroom walls. But the Court carefully pointed out 
that the Commandments were posted as a religious admoni-
tion, rather than being "integrated into the school curricu-
lum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an ap-
propriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative 
religion, or the like." 449 U. S., at 42. Similarly, in 
Abingdon, although the Court struck down the practices in 
¥. 
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two states requiring daily Bible readings in public schools, it 
specifically noted that nothing in the Court's holding was in-
tended to ''indicat[e] that such study of the Bible or of reli-
gion, when presented objecti.vely. as part of a secular pro-
gram of education, may not be effected consistently with the 
First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225. 
(a) Here the District Court found that the inclusion of the 
creche had no secular purpose, and in so doing it rejected the 
City's claim that its reasons for including the creche were es-
sentially the same as its reason for sponsoring the display as 
a whole. The City's purposes are broad and general. The 
creche, which is a very small part of the total, simply depicts 
the historical origins and traditional elements of Christmas as 
part of the occasion that has long been recognized as a legal 
Holiday. In part it seeks to attract people to the downtown 
commercial area in a continuing effort to promote retail sales 
for the merchants. At the same time it goes beyond the 
commercial aspect and seeks to engender a friendly commu-
nity spirit for the celebration of the Holiday, perhaps divert-
ing focus from less pleasant events. 
The Court has invoked the Establishment Clause to invali-
date legislation or governmental action on the ground that 
secular purpose was lacking, but it has done this only when 
there was no question that the statute or activity was moti-
vated by religious considerations. See, e. g., Stone v. Gra-
ham, supra; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968); 
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Even where the benefit to reli-
gion is substantial, as with the exemption of churches from 
taxation, we saw no conflict with the Establishment Clause; 
history was an important factor in the Court's holding in 
Walz, supra. 
There is insufficient evidence in this case to establish that 
the inclusion of the creche was a purposeful or surreptitious 
effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy 
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The City, like the Congress and Presidents, has simply taken 
note of a significant historical event long celebrated in the 
Western world. The creche is "simply one of a group of ob-
jects assembled to show how the American people celebrate 
the holiday season surrounding Christmas." See Allen v. 
Hickel, 424 F. 2d 944, 949 (CADC 1970). 
Chief Judge Campbell's cogent observations in dissent in 
the Court of Appeals reflect the secular purpose of the dis-
play in promoting a spirit of tolerance and accommodation: 
"The whole melange, including the creche, was nothing 
more nor less than a potpourri of well-recognized Christ-
mas symbols. Had a solitary creche been displayed in 
July, one might see it as designed to serve chiefly reli-
gious ends, since there would then be no holiday with 
which it was particularly identified. But creches and 
Santas in December are as typically symbolic of Christ-
mas as turkeys and Pilgrims in November are symbolic 
of Thanksgiving." 525 F. Supp., at 1037-1038. 
The real question is whether, taken as a whole, including the 
creche, the display ~vidences a religious purpose violative of 
the Establishment Clause and must be suppressed. On this 
record we hold that the purpose of the challenged display as a 
whole is secular. 
(b) The District Court found that the primary effect of in-
clusion of the creche is to advance religion. Comparisons of 
the relative benefits to religion of different forms of support 
are elusive and difficult to make. But to conclude that the 
primary effect of the creche i im ermis ible would require 
that we view it as more benefic1 an more an en ors -
ment of religion, for example, than the expenditure of large 
sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the 
country to students at church-sponsored schools, Board of 
Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); 6 the expenditure 
'The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely 
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school." 392 U. S., at 244. 
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of public funds for transportation of students attending 
church-sponsored schools, Everscm v. Board of Education, 
supra; 7 the Federal grants for college buildings of church-
sponsored institutions of higher education which are a part of 
an institutional complex combining secular and religious edu-
cation, Tilton v. Rickardscm, 403 U. S. 672 (1971); the non-
categorical grants to church-sponsored colleges and universi-
ties, Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976); 
the tax exemption for church properties sanctioned in Walz, 
supra. It would also require that we view it as more of an 
endorsement of religion than the Sunday closing laws upheld 
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 8 the release 
time program for religious training in Z orach, supra; and the 
legislative prayers upheld in Marsh, supra. 
We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving 
from inclusion of the creche than from these benefits previ-
ously approved. What was said about the legislative pray-
ers in Marsh, supra, at --, and implied about the Sunday 
Closing Laws in McGowan is 'true of the City's inclusion of 
the creche: its ''reason or effect merely happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some . . . religions." See 
McGowan, supra, at 442. 
The Court has made it abundantly clear that ''not every 
law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit 
upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally 
invalid." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra. Here, given the context in which the creche is dis-
played, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all reli-
gions, is indirect, remote and incidental; the primary effect of 
7 In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "some children might not be 
sent to the church schoois if the parents were compelled to pay their chil-
dren's bus fares ... " 330 U. S., at 17. 
8 "ln McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained 
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat 
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even at-
tend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776. 
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the creche no more advances r endorse religion than the 
Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the 
Holiday itself as "Christ's Mass." 
(c) The District Court found that there had been no admin-
istrative entanglement between religion and state resulting 
from the City's ownership and use of the creche. 525 F. 
Supp., at 1179. But it went on to hold that some political 
divisiveness was engendered by this litigation. Coupled 
with an impermissible sectarian purpose and effect, this per-
suaded the court that there was "excessive entanglement." 
The Court of Appeals expressly declined to accept the Dis-
trict Court's finding that inclusion of the creche has caused 
political divisiveness, and noted that this Court has never 
held that the potential for political divisiveness alone was suf-
ficient to invalidate government conduct. 
Entanglement is a question of kind and degree. Here 
there was no evidence of contact with church authorities con-
cerning the content of the exhibit prior to or since the City's 
purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of 
the creche have been necessary; and since the City owns the 
creche, now valued at $200.00, the tangible material it con-
tributes is de minimis. Nor does the display implicate any 
ongoing, day-to-day interaction between church and state. 
There is here nothing like the continuing administrative in-
volvement present in Nyquist, supra; Lemon, supra; and 
Levitt v. Committee j& Public Education, 413 U. S. 472 
(1973). 
Apart from this litigation there is no evidence of political 
friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history 
of the Christmas celebration. Paradoxically, given its inti-
mation of divisiveness, the District Court stated that the in-
clusion of the creche for 40 years had been "marked by no ap-
parent dissension" and that the display has had a "calm 
history." 525 F. Supp., at 1179. Of course, respondents 
cannot, by the very act of commencing this lawsuit, create 
the appearance of divisiveness and then proceed to exploit it 
82-1256--4>PINION 
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as evidence. Be that as it may, this case does not involve a 
jirect. subsidy to church-sponsored schools or colleges, Q!: 
other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into poten-
tial divisiveness is called- for, Mueller v. Allen, - .- U. S. 
-, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n. 11 (1983). 
We are satisfied that the City's primary purpose in includ-
ing the creche is secular, not sectarian, that it does not im-
permissibly advance religion, and that it does not create ex-
cessive entanglement between religion and government. 
E 
A creche, like a painting, is passive; in this context it is a 
reminder of the origins of Christmas. Of course it is identi-
fied with a religious faith but no more so than the examples 
we have set out from prior cases in which we found no conflict 
with the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., McGowan, 
supra; Marsh, supra. The creche may well have special 
meaning to those whose faith includes the celebration of reli-
gious masses, but none who sense the origins of the Christ-
mas celebration would fail to be aware of its religious implica-
tions. Even the traditional, purely secular displays extant 
at Christmas, with or without a creche, would inevitably re-
call those religious implications. 
To compel the removal of this one passive symbol-the 
creche-from a display at the very time people are taking 
note of the season with Christmas hymns and carols in public 
schools and other public places would be a stilted over-reac-
tion contrary to our history and our holdings. If the pres-
ence of the creche in this display violates the Establishment 
Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christ-
mas are equally offensive to the Constitution. 
In Everson, supra, the Court recognized that the "fears 
and political problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses 
in the 18th century are of less concern in the present day. 
330 U. S., at 8. It would be ironic if the inclusion of a single 
symbol of a particular historic religious event, as part of a 
ni J Guw1' "ih. 
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celebration acknowledged in the Western world for 20 centu-
ries, and in this country by ·the ·people, by the Executive 
Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for two centuries, 
would so ''taint" the whole exhibit as to make it violative of 
the Establishment Clause. 
We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
the Vicar of Rome or other powerful religious leaders behind 
every acknowledgment of the religious symbols which have 
long been officially recognized by the three constitutional 
branches of government. In short, any notion that these 
symbols of Christmas pose a real danger of establishment of a 
state church is farfetched indeed. 
F 
That this Court has been alert to the constitutionally ex-
pressed opposition to the establishment of religion is shown 
in numerous holdings striking down statutes or programs as 
violative of the Clause. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra; 
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Epperson v. 
Arkansas, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra; and McCollum v. 
Board of Education, supra. The most recent example is 
found in the case invalidating a municipal ordinance granting 
to a church a virtual veto power over the licensing of liquor 
establishments near a church. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 
-- U. S. -- (1983). Taken together these cases abun-
dantly demonstrate the Court's concern to protect the genu-
ine objectives of the Establishment Clause. It is far too late 
in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the Clause on the 
country. 
III 
We hold that the challenged program of the City of Paw-
tucket does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 9 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed. 
Reversed. 
'The Court of Appeals viewed Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982), 
as commanding a "strict scrutiny" due to the City's ownership of the $200 
•, 
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creche which it considers as a discrimination between Christian and other 
religions. It is correct that we require strict scrutiny of a statute or prac-
tice discriminatory on its face. But we are unable to see this display, or 
any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in 
Larson any more than the hundreds, if not thousands, of religious paint-
ings exhibited in galleries and museums throughout the country are dis-
criminatory against non-Christian religions. 
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opposite message. See generally Abington School District 
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). 
Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1970), as a 
guide to detecting these two forms of unconstitutional gov-
ernment action. 1 It is has never been entirely clear, how-
ever, how the three parts of the test relate to the principles 
enshrined in the Establishment Clause. Focusing on institu-
tional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of re-
ligion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device. 
II 
In this case, as even the District Court found, there is no 
institutional entanglement. Nevertheless, the appellees 
contend that the political divisiveness caused by Pawtucket's 
display of its creche violates the excessive-entanglement 
prong of the Lemon test. The Court's opinion follows the 
suggestion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. --, -- n. 11 
'The Court wrote in Lemon v. Kurtzman that a statute must pass three 
tests to withstand Establishment Clause challenge. 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its prin-
cipal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government en-
tanglement with religion."' 403 U. S., at 61~13 (citations omitted). 
Though phrased as a uniformly applicable test for constitutionality, this 
three-part test "provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with 
Establishment Clause challenges." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. --, --
(1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)). 
Moreover, the Court has held that a statute or practice that plainly em-
bodies an intentional discrimination among religions must be closely fitted 
to a compelling state purpose in order to survive constitutional challenge. 
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982). As the Court's opinion ob-
serves, ante, at-- n. 9, this case does not involve such discrimination. 
The Larson standard, I believe, may be assimilated to the Lemon test in 
the clarified version I propose. Plain intentional discrimination should 
give rise to a presumption, which may be overcome by a showing of com-
pelling purpose and close fit, that the challenged government conduct con-
stitutes an endorsement of the favored religion or a disapproval of the 
disfavored. 
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(1983), and concludes that "no inquiry into potential divisive-
ness is called for" in this case. Ante, at--. In my view, 
political divisiveness along religious lines should not be an in-
dependent test for constitutionality. 
Although several of our cases have discussed political divi-
siveness under the entanglement prong of Lemon, see, e. g., 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
796 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 623, we have 
never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for 
holding a government practice unconstitutional. Guessing 
the potential for political divisiveness inherent in a govern-
ment practice is simply too speculative an enterprise, in part 
because the existence of the litigation, as this case illustrates, 
itself may affect the political response to the government 
practice. Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil ad-
dressed by the Establishment Clause. Its existence may be 
evidence that institutional entanglement is excessive or that 
a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of reli-
gion. But the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately 
on the character of the government activity that might cause 
such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself. The entan-
glement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to insti-
tutional entanglement. 
III 
The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has en-
dorsed Christianity by its display of the creche. To answer 
that question, we must examine both what Pawtucket in-
tended to communicate in displaying the creche and what 
message the City's display actually conveyed. The purpose 
and effect prongs of the Lemon test represent these two as-
pects of the meaning of the City's action. 
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both 
on the intention of the speaker and on the "objective" mean-
ing of the statement in the community. Some listeners need 
not rely solely on the words themselves in discerning the 
speaker's intent: they can judge the intent by, for example, 
~· ' 
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examining the context of the statement or asking questions of 
the speaker. Other listeners do not have or will not seek ac-
cess to such evidence of intent. They will rely instead on the 
words themselves; for them the message actually conveyed 
may be something not actually intended. If the audience is 
large, as it always is when government "speaks" by word or 
deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a 
message determined by the "objective" content of the state-
ment, and some portion will inevitably receive the intended 
message. Examination of both the subjective and the objec-
tive components of the message communicated by a govern-
ment action is therefore necessary to determine whether the 
action carries a forbidden meaning. 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether gov-
ernment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of reli-
gion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of govern-
ment's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact 
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An af-
firmative answer to either question should render the chal-
lenged practice invalid. 
A 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a gov-
ernment activity have a secular purpose. That requirement 
is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secu-
lar purpose, however dominated by religious purposes. In 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980), for example, the Court 
held that posting copies of the Ten Commandments in schools 
violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test although instill-
ing most of the values of the Ten Commandments and illus-
trating their connection to our legal system are secular objec-
tives. See also Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, 
374 U. S., at 223-224. The proper inquiry under the pur-
pose prong of Lemon, I submit, is whether the government 




Applying that formulation to this case, I would find that 
Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of endorse-
ment of Christianity or disapproval of non Christian religions. 
The evident purpose of including the creche in the larger dis-
play was not promotion of the religious content of the creche 
but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional 
symbols. Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural 
significance even if they also have religious aspects, is a le-
gitimate secular purpose. 
The District Court's finding that the display of the creche 
had no secular purpose was based on erroneous reasoning. 
The District Court believed that it should ascertain the City's 
purpose in displaying the creche separate and apart from the 
general purpose in setting up the display. It also found that, 
because the tradition-celebrating purpose was suspect in the 
court's eyes, the City's use of an unarguably religious symbol 
"raises an inference" of intent to endorse. When viewed in 
light of correct legal principles, the District Court's finding of 
unlawful purpose was clearly erroneous. 
B 
Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disap-
proval of religion makes clear that the effect prong of the 
Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation 
of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, 
even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of reli-
gion. The laws upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 1 
U. S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious, educational, 
and charitable organizations), McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420 (1960) (mandatory Sunday closing law), and in 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (released time from 
school for off-campus religious instruction), had such effects, 
but they did not violate the Establishment Clause. What is 
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of 
communicating a message of government endorsement or dis-
approval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, 
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whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion 
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the po-
litical community. 
Pawtucket's display of its creche, I believe, does not com-
municate a message that the government intends to endorse 
the Christian beliefs represented by the creche. Although 
the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the creche, 
as the district court found, is not neutralized by the setting, 
the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly 
understand to be the purpose of the display-as a typical mu-
seum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of 
a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of 
that content. The display celebrates a public holiday, and no 
one contends that declaration of that holiday is understood to 
be an endorsement of religion. The holiday itself has very 
strong secular components and traditions. Government 
celebration of the holiday, which is extremely common, gen-
erally is not understood to endorse the religious content of 
the holiday, just as government celebration of Thanksgiving 
is not so understood. The creche is a traditional symbol of 
the holiday that is very commonly displayed along with 
purely secular symbols, as it was in Pawtucket. 
These features combine to make the government's display 
of the creche in this particular setting no more an endorse-
ment of religion than such governmental "acknowledgments" 
of religion as nonsectarian legislative prayers, government 
declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of 
"In God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions with 
"God save the United States and this honorable court." 
Those government acknowledgments of religion serve, in the 
only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate 
secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing 
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of 
what is worthy of appreciation in society. For that reason, 
and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are 
not understood as conveying government approval of particu-
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lar religious beliefs. The display of the creche likewise 
serves a secular purpose-celebration of a public holiday with 
traditional symbols. It cannot fairly be understood to con-
vey a message of government endorsement of religion. It is 
significant in this regard that the creche display apparently 
caused no political divisiveness prior to the filing of this law-
suit, although Pawtucket had incorporated the creche in its 
annual Christmas display for some years. For these rea-
sons, I conclude that Pawtucket's display of the creche does 
not have the effect of communicating endorsement of Chris-
tianity. 
The District Court's subsidiary findings on the effect test 
are consistent with this conclusion. The court found as facts 
that the creche has a religious content, that it would not be 
seen as an insignificant part of the display, that its religious 
content is not neutralized by the setting, that the display is 
celebratory and not instructional, and that the city did not 
seek to counteract any possible religious message. These 
findings do not imply that the creche communicates govern-
ment approval of Christianity. The District Court also 
found, however, that the government was understood to 
place its imprimatur on the religious content of the creche. 
But whether a government activity communicates endorse-
ment of religion is not a question of simple historical fact. 
Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the 
question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based 
classifications communicate an invidious message, in large 
part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial 
interpretation of social facts. The District Court's conclu-
sion concerning the effect of Pawtucket's display of its creche 
was in error as a matter of law. 
IV 
The city of Pawtucket is alleged to have violated the 
Establishment Clause by endorsing the Christian beliefs rep-
resented by the creche included in its Christmas display. 
Every government practice must be judged in its unique cir-
82-1256-CONCUR 
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cumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion, and in making that deter-
mination, courts must keep in mind both the fundamental 
place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional 
scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment 
Clause values can be eroded. Government practices that 
purport to celebrate or acknowledge events with religious 
significance must be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny. 
Doing so here, I cannot say that the particular creche display 
at issue in this case was intended to endorse or had the effect 
of endorsing Christianity. I agree with the Court that the 
judgment below must be reversed. 
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From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: FEB 2 l984 
5th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1256 
DENNIS LYNCH, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
DANIEL DONNELLY ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1984] 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality 
from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual 
Christmas display. 
I 
Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail mer-
chants' association, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, 
erects a Christmas display as part of its observance of the 
Christmas holiday season. The display is situated in a park 
owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of 
the shopping district. The display is essentially like those to 
be found in hundreds of towns or cities across the Nation-
often on public grounds-during the Christmas season. The 
Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decora-
tions traditionally associated with Christmas, including, 
among other things , a Santa Claus' house, reindeer pulling 
Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, cutout figures represent-
ing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, 
hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEA-
SONS GREETINGS," and the creche at issue here. All 
components of this display are owned by the City. 
The creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or 
more years, consists of the traditional figures, including the 
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animals all ranging in height from 5" to 5'. In 1973, when 
the present creche was acquired, it cost the City $1365; it 
now is valued at $200.00. The erection and dismantling of 
the creche costs the City about $20 per year; nominal ex-
penses are incurred in lighting the creche. No money has 
been expended on its maintenance for the past 10 years. 
Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual mem-
bers of the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, and the affiliate itself, brought this action in the 
United States District Court for Rhode Island, challenging 
the City's inclusion of the creche in the annual display. The 
District Court held, Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 
1178 (D. R. I. 1981), that the City's inclusion of the creche in 
the display violated the Establishment Clause, which is bind-
ing on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
District Court held that, by including the creche in the 
Christmas display, the City has "tried to endorse and pro-
mulgate [religious] beliefs," 525 F. Supp., at 1173, and that 
"erection of the creche has the real and substantial effect of 
affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche 
represents." I d., at 1177. This "appearance of official 
sponsorship," it held, "confers more than a remote and inci-
dental benefit on Christianity." Id., at 1178. Last, al-
though the court acknowledged the absence of administrative 
entanglement, it found that excessive entanglement had been 
fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including 
the creche in the celebration. Id., at 1179-1180. The City 
was permanently enjoined from including the creche in the 
display. 
A divided panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F. 2d 1029 (1982). We 
granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1983), and we reverse. 
II 
A 
This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establish-
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"to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either 
[the church or the state] into the precincts of the other." 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 614 (1970). 
At the same time, however, the Court reminded that, 
"total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. 
Some relationship between government and religious 
organizations is inevitable." Ibid. · 
An Establishment Clause challenge must be examined in 
light of these principles. 
The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses 
as erecting a "wall" between church and state, see, e. g., 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18 (1947). The 
concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of speech 
probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. 1 The 
metaphor has served as a reminder that the Establishment 
Clause forbids an established church or anything approaching 
it. But the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate descrip-
tion of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact ex-
ists between church and state. 
No significant segment of our society and no institution 
within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation 
from all the other parts, much less from government. "It 
has never been thought either possible or desirable to enforce 
a regime of total separation .... " Committee for Public 
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
760 (1973). And the Constitution does not require complete 
separation; it mandates tolerance of all religions, and forbids 
hostility toward any. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U. S. 306, 314, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require the 
"callous indifference" that we have said was never intended 
by the Establishment Clause. Z orach, supra, at 314. In-
deed, we have observed that such hostility would bring us 
' See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. (8 Otto) 145, 164 (1878) 
(quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a committee of the 
Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802)) . 
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into "war with our national tradition as embodied in the First 
Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion." 
McCollum, supra, at 211-212. 
B 
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment ·clause has 
comported with what history reveals was the contemporane-
ous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example 
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is 
found in the events of the first week of the First Session of 
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress 
approved the Establishment Clause, as part of the Bill of 
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation 
providing for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In 
Marsh v. Chambers, -- U. S. -- (1983), we noted that 
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention where freedom of 
speech, press and religion and antagonism toward an estab-
lished church were subjects of frequent discussion. We saw 
no conflict with the Establishment Clause when Nebraska 
employed members of the clergy as official Legislative Chap-
lains to give opening prayers at sessions of the State Legisla-
ture. /d. 
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Con-
gress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the 
Court's statement that the First Congress, 
"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have al-
ways been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of 
the greatest weight in the interpretation of that funda-
mental document," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 
174-175 (1926) 
It is clear that neither the draftsmen of the Constitution who 
were Members of the First Congress, nor the Congress of 
1789, saw any Establishment problem in the employment of 
Congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Con-
gress, a practice that has continued for nearly two centuries. 
' ..
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It would be difficult to identify a more striking example of the 
accommodation of religious belief intended by the Framers. 
c 
There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by 
all three branches of government of the role of religion in 
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in the opinions of 
this Court was this more affirmatively expressed than in the 
statement of Justice Douglas for the Court in the opinion vali-
dating a program allowing release of public school students 
from classes to attend off-campus religious exercises. Re-
jecting a claim that the program violated the Establishment 
Clause, the Court stated: 
"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 
315 (1952). 
Our history is replete with official references to the value 
and need for Divine guidance in deliberations and pronounce-
ments of the Founding Fathers as well as contemporary lead-
ers. Beginning in the early colonial period long before Inde-
pendence, a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a 
religious holiday to give thanks for the bounties of Nature as 
gifts from God. President Washington and his successors 
proclaimed Thanksgiving, with all its religious overtones a 
day of national celebration 2 and Congress made it a National 
' The day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged 
President Washington to proclaim "a day of public thanksgiving and 
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts, the many 
and signal favours of Almighty God." See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church 
and State in the United States 87 (rev. 1st ed. 1964). President Washing-
ton proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to "offer[] our 
prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations, and 
beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions. . .. " 1 
J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents 1789-1897 64 (1899). 
Presidents Adams and Madison also issued thanksgiving proclamations, 
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Holiday. 5 U. S. C. § 6103(a) (1982). That holiday has not 
lost its theme of expressing thanks for divine aid. 3 
Executive orders and other official announcements of Pres-
idents and of the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas 
and Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms. 
And, by Acts of Congress, it has long been the practice that 
federal employees are released from duties on these National 
Holidays, while being paid from the same public revenues 
that provide the compensation of the Chaplains of the Senate 
and the House and the military services. Thus, it is clear 
that government has long recognized-indeed it has subsi-
dized-holidays with religious significance. 
Other examples of religious references are found in the 
statutorily prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," 36 
U. S. C. § 186 (1976), which Congress and the President 
mandated for our currency, see 31 U. S. C. § 324 (1976); and 
in the language "One nation under God," as part of the Pledge 
of Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by 
United States 180-193 (1950), through the incumbent, see Proclamation 
No. 4883, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,153 (1981). 
3 An example is found in President Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of 
Thanksgiving: 
"[I]t is fitting that we give thanks with special fervor to our Heavenly 
Father for the mercies we have received individually and as a nation and 
for the blessings He has restored, through the victories of our arms and 
those of our Allies, to His children in other lands. 
* * * 
To the end that we may bear more earnest witness to our gratitude to 
Almighty God, I suggest a nationwide reading of the Holy Scriptures dur-
ing the period from Thanksgiving Day to Christmas." Proclamation No. 
2629, 9 Fed. Reg. 13,099 (1944). · 
President Reagan and his immediate predecessors have issued similar 
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5098, 48 Fed. Reg. 42,801 
(1983); Proclamation No. 4803, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,633 (1980); Proclamation 
No. 4333, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,003 (1974); Proclamation No. 4093, 36 Fed. Reg. 
21,401 (1971); Proclamation No. 3752, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,635 (1966); Proc-
lamation No. 3560, 28 Fed. Reg. 11,871 (1963) . 
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thousands of public school children-and adults-every year. 
Countless other official acknowledgments of our religious 
heritage and history are readily found. 4 
Art galleries supported by public revenues display reli-
gious paintings of the 15th and 16th Centuries, predomi-
nantly inspired by one religious faith. The National Gallery 
in Washington, maintained with government support, for ex-
ample, has long exhibited masterpieces with religious mes-
sages, notably the Last Supper, and paintings depicting the 
Birth of Christ, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, among 
many others with explicit Christian themes and messages. 5 
The very chamber in which oral arguments on this case were 
heard is decorated with a notable and permanent-not sea-
sonal-symbol of religion: Moses with Ten Commandments. 
Congress has long provided chapels in the Capitol for reli-
gious worship and meditation. 
These are but a few illustrations of the government's 
acknowledgment of our religious heritage and sponsorship of 
graphic manifestations of that heritage. One cannot look at 
even a brief resume of those relationships without finding 
that our history is pervaded by expressions of religious be-
liefs such as Justice Douglas expressed in Z orach, supra. 
• Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of 
Prayer each year "on which the people of the United States may turn to 
God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as individuals." 
36 U. S. C. § 169h (1976). Our presidents have repeatedly issued such 
proclamations. See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261 
(1983); Proclamation No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation 
No. 4379, 40 Fed. Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087, 36 Fed. Reg. 
19,961 (1971); Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proc-
lamation No. 3501, 27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962). 
Presidential proclamations and messages have issued to commemorate 
Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No. 4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077 
(1981), and the Jewish High Holy Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058 
(Sept. 29, 1981). 
5 The National Gallery regularly exhibits more than 200 similar religious 
paintings. 
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Equally pervasive is the concept of tolerance of all faiths, and 
all forms of religious expression, and hostility toward none. 
D 
This history may help explain why the Court consistently 
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establish-
ment Clause. We have refused "to construe the Religion 
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate 
constitutional objective as illuminated by history." Walz v. 
Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis 
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions 
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage di-
versity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in 
applying the Establishment Clause to religious expression is 
simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the Court. 
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental 
conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recog-
nition to one faith-as an absolutist approach would dictate-
the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official 
conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a reli-
gion or religious faith, or tends to do so. See Walz, supra, 
at 669. This approach is consistent with what Joseph Story 
wrote a century and a half ago: 
"The real object of the First Amendment was ... to pre-
vent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which 
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of 
the national government." 3 Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States 1871 (1833). 
In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, 
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like 
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed paragraph 
in a legal code capable of mechanical application. The pur-
pose of the Establishment Clause "was to state an objective, 
not to write a statute." Walz, supra, at 668. The line be-
tween permissible relationships and those barred by the 
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Clause can no more be straight and unwavering than due 
process can be defined in a single stroke or phrase or test. 
The Clause erects a "blurred, indistinct, [a] variable barrier 
depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
ship." Lemon, supra, at 614. 
In the line-drawing process we have at times found it use-
ful to inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a 
secular purpose; whether its principal or primary effect is to 
advance or inhibit religion; and whether it creates an exces-
sive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon, 
supra. The focus of the inquiry in this case must be on the 
creche in the context of the entire Christmas display. See 
e. g. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); 
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). 
In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state statute re-
quiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on 
public classroom walls. But the Court carefully pointed out 
that the Commandments were posted as a religious admoni-
tion, not "integrated into the school curriculum, where the 
Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of 
history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like." 
449 U. S., at 42. Similarly, in Abingdon, although the Court 
struck down the practices in two states requiring daily Bible 
readings in public schools, it specifically noted that nothing in 
the Court's holding was intended to "indicat[e] that such 
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively 
as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected 
consistently with the First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225. 
Here the District Court found that the inclusion of the 
creche had no secular purpose, and in so doing it rejected the 
City's claim that its reasons for including the creche were es-
sentially the same as its reason for sponsoring the display as 
a whole. The City's purposes are broad and general. In 
part it seeks to attract people to the downtown commercial 
area in a continuing effort to promote retail sales for the mer-
chants. At the same time it goes beyond the commercial as-
82-1256-0PINION 
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pect and seeks to engender a friendly community spirit for 
the celebration of the Holiday, perhaps diverting focus from 
less pleasant events. 
The Court has invoked the Establishment Clause to invali-
date legislation or governmental action on the ground that 
secular purpose was lacking, but it has done this only when 
there was no question that the statute or activity was moti-
vated by religious considerations. See, e. g., Stone v. Gra-
ham, supra; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968); 
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Even where the benefit to reli-
gion is substantial, as with the exemption of churches from 
taxation, we saw no conflict with the Establishment Clause; 
history was an important factor in the Court's holding in 
Walz, supra, as history is important here. 
There is insufficient evidence in this case to establish that 
the inclusion of the creche was a purposeful or surreptitious 
effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy 
or endorsement of religion or a particular religious message. 
The City, like the Congress and Presidents, has simply taken 
note of a significant historical event long celebrated in the 
Western world. The creche, as part of the City's celebra-
tion, merely depicts the historical origins and traditional ele-
ments of Christmas as part of the occasion that has long been 
recognized as a National Holiday. It is "simply one of a 
group of objects assembled to show how the American people 
celebrate the holiday season surrounding Christmas." See 
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F. 2d 944, 949 (CADC 1970); see also, I 
Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. 
City and County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 
1981). As Chief Judge Campbell cogently observed in dis-
sent in the Court of Appeals: " ... creches and Santas in De-
cember are as typically symbolic of Christmas as turkeys and 
Pilgrims in November are symbolic of Thanksgiving." 525 
F. Supp., at 1037-1038. 
. ' 
82-125&-0PINION 
LYNCH v. DONNELLY 11 
The real question is whether, taken as a whole, including 
the creche, the display evidences a religious purpose violative 
of the Establishment Clause and must be suppressed. On 
this record we hold that the City had a secular purpose for 
the challenged display. 
The District Court found that the primary effect of inclu-
sion of the creche is to advance religion. Comparisons of the 
relative benefits to religion of different forms of support are 
elusive and difficult to make. But to conclude that the pri-
mary effect of including the creche is to advance religion im-
permissibly would require that we view it as more beneficial 
to or more an endorsement of religion, for example, than the 
expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks sup-
plied throughout the country to students attending church-
sponsored schools, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 
236 (1968); 6 the expenditure of public funds for transporta-
tion of students to church-sponsored schools, Everson v. 
Board of Education, supra; 7 the Federal grants for college 
buildings of church-sponsored institutions of higher education 
combining secular and religious education, Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U. S. 672 (1971); the noncategorical grants to 
church-sponsored colleges and universities, Roemer v. Board 
of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976); and the tax exemption 
for church properties sanctioned in Walz, supra. It would 
also require that we view it as more of an endorsement of re-
ligion than the Sunday closing laws upheld in McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 8 the release time program 
6 The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely 
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school." 392 U. S., at 244. 
7 In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is undoubtedly true that 
children are helped to get to church schools," and that "some of the chil-
dren might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled 
to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets ... " 330 U. S., 
at 17. 
8 "ln McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained 
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat 
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for religious training in Z orach, supra; and the legislative 
prayers upheld in Marsh, supra. 
We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving 
from inclusion of the creche than from these benefits previ-
ously approved. What was said about the legislative pray-
ers in Marsh, supra, at --, and implied about the Sunday 
Closing Laws in McGowan is true of the City's inclusion of 
the creche: its "reason or effect merely happens to coincide or 
harmonize with the tenets of some . . . religions." See 
McGowan, supra, at 442. We think this case differs from 
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, -- U.S. -- (1983), and 
McCollum, supra. In Grendel's Den, important govern-
mental power had been vested in churches; in McCollum, 
governmental power was employed in a way that encouraged 
pupils to receive religious instruction. 
The Court has made it abundantly clear that "not every 
law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit 
upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally 
invalid." Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 
supra. Here, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to 
all religions, is indirect, remote and incidental; the primary 
effect of including the creche no more advances or endorses 
religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of 
the origins of the Holiday itself as "Christ's Mass," or the ex-
hibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in govern-
mentally supported museums. 
The District Court found that there had been no adminis-
trative entanglement between religion and state resulting 
from the City's ownership and use of the creche. 525 F. 
Supp., at 1179. But it went on to hold that some political 
divisiveness was engendered by this litigation. Coupled 
with its finding of an impermissible sectarian purpose and ef-
fect, this persuaded the court that there was "excessive en-
tanglement." The Court of Appeals expressly declined to 
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even at-
tend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776. 
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accept the District Court's finding that inclusion of the creche 
has caused political divisiveness along religious lines, and 
noted that this Court has never held that the potential for po-
litical divisiveness alone was sufficient to invalidate govern-
ment conduct. 
Entanglement is a question of kind and degree. Here 
there was no evidence of contact with church authorities con-
cerning the content of the exhibit prior to or since the City's 
purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of 
the creche have been necessary; and since the City owns the 
creche, now valued at $200.00, the tangible material it con-
tributes is de minimis. In many respects the display re-
quires far less ongoing, day-to-day interaction between 
church and state than religious paintings in public galleries. 
There is here nothing like the continuing comprehensive ad-
ministrative involvement present in Nyquist, supra; Lemon, 
supra; and Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 
u. s. 472 (1973). 
This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-spon-
sored schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and 
hence no inquiry into potential divisiveness is called for, 
Mueller v. Allen,- U.S.--, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n. 11 
(1983). But apart from this litigation there is no evidence of 
political friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year 
history of the Christmas celebration. In conflict with its 
finding of divisiveness, the District Court stated that the in-
clusion of the creche for 40 years had been "marked by no ap-
parent dissension" and that the display has had a "calm his-
tory." 525 F. Supp., at 1179. In any event, a litigant 
cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, create the 
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of 
entanglement. 
We are satisfied that the City's primary purpose in includ-
ing the creche is secular, not sectarian, that it does not im-
permissibly advance religion, and that it does not create ex-
cessive entanglement between religion and government. 
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A creche, like a painting, is passive; admittedly it is a re-
minder of the origins of Christmas. Of course it is identified 
with one religious faith but no more so than the examples we 
have set out from prior cases in which we found no conflict 
with the Establishment Clause. See, e. g., McGowan, 
supra; Marsh, supra. The creche may well have special 
meaning to those whose faith includes the celebration of reli-
gious masses, but none who sense the origins of the Christ-
mas celebration would fail to be aware of its religious implica-
tions. Even the traditional, purely secular displays extant 
at Christmas, with or without a creche, would inevitably re-
call the religious nature of the Holiday. 
It would be ironic if the inclusion of a single symbol of a 
particular historic religious event, as part of a celebration ac-
knowledged in the Western world for 20 centuries, and in this 
country by the people, by the Executive Branch, by the Con-
gress, and the courts for two centuries, would so "taint" the 
City's exhibit as to render it violative of the Establishment 
Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol-the 
creche-at the very time people are taking note of the season 
with Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and other 
public places, and while the Congress and Legislatures open 
sessions with prayers by paid chaplains would be a stilted 
over-reaction contrary to our history and our holdings. If 
the presence of the creche in this display violates the Estab-
lishment Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note 
of Christmas are equally offensive to the Constitution. 
The Court has acknowledged that the "fears and political 
problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses in the 18th 
century are of far less concern in the present day. Everson, 
supra, 330 U. S., at 8. We are unable to perceive the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome or other powerful 
religious leaders behind every public acknowledgment of the 
religious faith whose symbols have long been officially recog-
nized by the three constitutional branches of government. 
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In short, any notion that these symbols of Christmas pose a 
real danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched 
indeed. 
F 
That this Court has been alert to the constitutionally ex-
pressed opposition to the establishment of religion is shown 
in numerous holdings striking down statutes or programs as 
violative of the Clause. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra; 
Abingdon School District v. Schempp, supra; Epperson v. 
Arkansas, supra; Engle v. Vitale, supra; and McCollum v. 
Board of Education, supra. The most recent example of 
that careful scrutiny is found in the case invalidating a munic-
ipal ordinance granting to a church a virtual veto power over 
the licensing of liquor establishments near a church. Larkin 
v. Grendel's Den, supra. Taken together these cases abun-
dantly demonstrate the Court's concern to protect the genu-
ine objectives of the Establishment Clause. It is far too late 
in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the Clause on the 
country. 
III 
We hold that the challenged program of the City of Paw-
tucket does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 9 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is reversed. 
Reversed. 
9 The Court of Appeals viewed Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982), 
as commanding a "strict scrutiny" due to the City's ownership of the 
$200.00 creche which it considers as a discrimination between Christian 
and other religions. It is correct that we require strict scrutiny of a stat-
ute or practice discriminatory on its face. But we are unable to see this 
display, or any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contem-
plated in Larson any more than the hundreds, if not thousands, of religious 
paintings exhibited in galleries and museums throughout the country are 
discriminatory against non-Christian religions. 
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mas spirit, brotherhood, peace, and let loose with their 
money." See 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (R. I. 1981). The 
creche has been relegated to the role of a neutral harbinger of 
the holiday season, useful for commercial purposes, but de-
void of any inherent meaning and incapable of enhancing the 
religious tenor of a display of which it is an integral part. 
The city has its victory-but it is a Pyrrhic one indeed. 
The import of the Court's decision is to encourage use of 
the creche in a municipally sponsored display, a setting 
where Christians feel constrained in acknowledging its sym-
bolic meaning and non-Christians feel alienated by its pres-
ence. Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred symbol. Because 
I cannot join the Court in denying either the force of our 
precedents or the sacred message that is at the core of the 
creche, I dissent and join JuSTICE BRENNAN's opinion. 
l 
~ -(Slip Opinion) 
NOTE: Where it is feasible , a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 
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pared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See 
United States v. Detroit Lumber Co. , 200 U. S. 321, 337. 
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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FIRST CIRCUI~ 44<~-t.J.._._ 
No. 82--1256. Argued October 4, 1983-DecideFM:r~htw84''" - 1 .4 ./ 1# 
The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erects a Christmas display in a park 
owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the city's 
shopping district. The display includes, in addition to such objects as a 
Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads "SEA-
SONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity scene, which has been part 
of this annual display for 40 years or more. Respondents brought an 
action in Federal District Court, challenging the inclusion of the creche 
in the display on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the challenge and per-
manently enjoined the city from including the creche in the display. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: Notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, Pawtucket 
has not violated the Establishment Clause. Pp. 3-17. 
(a) The concept of a "wall" of separation between church and state is a 
useful metaphor but is not an accurate description of the practical as-
pects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitution does not 
require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively man-
dates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids 
hostility toward any. Anything less would require the "callous indiffer-
ence," Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314, that was never intended 
by the Establishment Clause. Pp. 3-4. 
(b) This Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause comports 
with the contemporaneous understanding of the Framers' intent. That 
neither the draftsmen of the Constitution, who were Members of the 
First Congress, nor the First Congress itself, saw any establishment 
problem in employing Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress is 
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Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
760 (1973). Nor does the Constitutloii require complete 
separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates ac-
commodation, not merely tolerance:Of all religions, and for-
bids 'hostility toward any. See, e. g., Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U. S. 306, 314, 315 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948). Anything less would require 
the "callous indifference" we have said was never intended by 
the Establishment Clause. Zorach, supra, at 314. Indeed, 
we have observed, such hostility would bring us into "war 
with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amend-
ment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion." 
McCollum, supra, at 211-212. 
B 
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause has 
comported with what history reveals was the contemporane-
ous understanding of its guarantees. A significant example 
of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is 
found in the events of the first week of the First Session of 
the First Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress 
approved the Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of 
Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation pro-
viding for paid chaplains for the House and Senate. In 
Marsh v. Chambers,-- U.S.-- (1983), we noted that 
seventeen Members of that First Congress had been Dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention where freedom of 
speech, press and religion and antagonism toward an estab-
lished church were subjects of frequent discussion. We saw 
no conflict with the Establishment Clause when Nebraska 
employed members of the clergy as official Legislative Chap-
lains to give opening prayers at sessions of the state legisla-
ture. I d., at --. 
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Con-
gress in 1789 takes on special significance in light of the 
Court's emphasis that the First Congress 
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"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have al-
ways been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of 
the greatest weight in the interpretation of that funda-
mental instument," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 
52, 174-175 (1926). 
It is clear that neither the seventeen draftsmen of the Con-
stitution who were Members of the First Congress, nor the 
Congress of 1789, saw any establishment problem in the em-
ployment of congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers in 
the Congress, a practice that has continued for nearly two 
centuries. It would be difficult to identify a more striking 
example of the accommodation of religious belief intended by 
the Framers. 
c 
There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by 
all three bran~verilment of the role of religion in 
American life from at least 1789. Seldom in our opinions was 
this more affirmatively expressed than in Justice Douglas' 
opinion for the Court validating a program allowing release of 
public school students from classes to attend off-campus reli-
gious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated 
the Establishment Clause, the Court asserted pointedly: 
''We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose 
a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 313. 
See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 
213 (1963). 
Our history is replete with official references to the value 
and invoca1ion of Divine guidance in deliberations and pro-
nouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary 
leaders. Beginning in the early colonial period long before 
Independence, a day of Thanksgiving was celebrated as a re-
ligious holiday to give thanks for the bounties of Nature as 
gifts from God. President Washington and his successors 
proclaimed Thanksgiving, with all its religious overtones, a 
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Presidents have repeatedly issued such Proclamations. 5 
Presidential Proclamations and messages have also issued to 
commemorate Jewish Heritage Week, Proclamation No. 
4844, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,077 (1981), and the Jewish High Holy 
Days, 17 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1058 (Sept. 29, 1981). 
One cannot look at even this brief resume without finding 
that our history is pervaded by expressions of religious be-
liefs such as are found in Zorach, supra. Equally pervasive 
is the evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of 
religious expression, and hostility toward none. Through 
this accommodation, as Justice Douglas observed, govern-
mental action has "follow[ed] the best of our traditions" and 
"respect[ed] the religious nature of our people." !d., at 314. 
III 
This history may help explain why the Court consistently 
has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establish-
ment Clause. We have refused "to construe the Religion 
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate 
constitutional objective as illuminated by history." Walz v. 
Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 671 (1970) (Emphasis 
added). In our modern, complex society, whose traditions 
and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage di-
versity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in 
applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been 
uniformly rejected by the Court. 
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental 
conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recog-
nition to religion in general or to one faith-as an absolutist 
approach would dictate-the Court has scrutinized chal-
lenged legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in 
reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to 
5 See, e. g., Proclamation No. 5017, 48 Fed. Reg. 4261 (1983); Proclama-
tion No. 4795, 45 Fed. Reg. 62,969 (1980); Proclamation No. 4379, 40 Fed. 
Reg. 25,429 (1975); Proclamation No. 4087, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,961 (1971); 
Proclamation No. 3812, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,015 (1967); Proclamation No. 3501, 
27 Fed. Reg. 10,147 (1962). 
~~~-
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do so. See Walz, supra, at 669. Joseph Story wrote a cen-
tury and a half ago: 
"The real object of the [First] Amendment was ... to 
prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which 
should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of 
the national government." 3 Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States 728 (1833). 
In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, 
per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause like 
the Due Process Clauses is not a precise, detailed provision in 
a legal code capable of ready application. The purpose of the 
Establishment Clause "was to state an objective, not to write 
a statute." Walz, supra, at 668. The line between permis-
sible relationships and those barred by the Clause can no 
more be straight and unwavering than due process can be de-
fined in a single stroke or phrase or test. The Clause erects 
a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all 
the circumstances of a particular relationship." Lemon, 
supra, at 614. 
In ~h line-drawing process we have often found it useful to 
inquL nether the challenged law or conduct has a secular r ~ 
purpo , hether it~incipal or primary effect is to advance -
or inhibit religion, a~hether it creates an excessive entan-
glement of government with religion. Lemon, supra. Buty / 
we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be con-
fined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area. 
See e. g. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 677-678 (1971); 
Nyquist, supra, 413 U. S., at 773. In two cases, the Court 
did not even apply the Lemon "test." We did not, for exam-
ple, consider that analysis relevant in Marsh, supra. Nor 
did we find Lemon useful in Lqrson v. V ak._nt~ U. S. 228 
(1982), where there was substantial evidence of overt dis-
crimination against a particular church. 
In this case, the focus of our inquiry must be on the creche 
in the context of the Christmas season. See, e. g., Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Abington School 
~ 'k.ol ~ 
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District v. Schempp, supra. In Stone, for example, we in-
validated a state statute requiring the posting of a copy of the 
Ten Commandments on public classroom walls. But the 
Court carefully pointed out that the Commandments were 
posted purely as a religious admonition, not "integrated into 
the school curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally 
be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, eth-
ics, comparative religion, or the like." 449 U. S., at 42. 
Similarly, in Abington, although the Court struck down the 
practices in two States requiring daily Bible readings in pub-
lic schools, it specifically noted that nothing in the Court's 
holding was intended to "indicat[e] that such study of the Bi-
ble or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a sec-
ular program of education, may not be effected consistently 
with the First Amendment." 374 U. S., at 225. Focus ex-
clusively on the religious component of any activity would in-
evitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment 
Clause. 
The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental ac-
tion on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but 
only when it has concluded there was no question that the 
statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious consid-
erations. See, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41; 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 107-109 (1968); Abing-
ton School District v. Schempp, supra, at 223-224; Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 424-425 (1962). Even where the bene-
fits to religion were substantial, as in Everson, supra; Board 
of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), Walz, supra, 
and Tilton, supra, we saw a secular purpose and no conflict 
with the Establishment Clause. Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's 
Den, 459 U. S. 116 (1983). 
The District Court inferred from the religious nature of the 
creche that the City has no secular purpose for the display. 
In so doing, it rejected the City's claim that its reasons for 
including the creche are essentially the same as its reasons 
for sponsoring the display as a whole. The District Court 
----
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plainly erred by focusing almost exclusively on the creche. 
When viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday 
season, it is apparent that, on this record, there is insufficient 
evidence to establish that the inclusion of the creche is a pur-
poseful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle 
governmental advocacy of a particular religious message. In 
a pluralistic society a variety of motives and purposes are im-
plicated. The City, like the Congresses and Presidents, 
however, has principally taken note of a significant historical 
religious event long celebrated in the Western World. The 
creche in the display depicts the historical origins of this tra-
ditional event long recognized as a National Holiday. See 
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F. 2d 944 (CADC 1970); Citizens Con-
cerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and 
County of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D Colo. 1981). 
The narrow question is whether there is a secular purpose 
for PawtlicKenraisp1ay of the creche. The dtsplay 1s spon-
sored by the City to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the 
origins of that Holiday. These are legitimate secular pur-
poses. 6 The District Court's inferenc~ drawn from the reli-
gious nature of the creche, that the City has no secular pur-
pose was, on this record, clearly erroneous. 7 
The District Court found that the primary effect of includ-
ing the creche is to confer a substantial and impermissible 
benefit on religion in general and on the Christian faith in . 
particular. Comparisons of the relative benefits to religion 
of different forms of governmental support are elusive and 
6 The City contends that the purposes of the display are "exclusively 
secular." We hold only that Pawtucket has a secular purpose for its dis-
play, which is all that Lemon requires. Were the test that the govern-
ment must have "exclusively secular" objectives, much of the conduct and 
legislation this Court has approved in the past would have been 
invalidated. 
7 JusTICE BRENNAN argues that the City's objectives could have been 
achieved without including.the creche in the display, post, at 6. True or 
not, that is irrelevant. The question is whether the display of the creche 
violates the Establishment Clause. 
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difficult to make. But to conclude that the primary effect of 
including the creche is to advance religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause would require that we view it as more 
beneficial to and more an endorsement of religion, for exam-
ple, than expenditure of large sums of public money for text-
books supplied throughout the country to students attending 
church-sponsored schools, Board of Education v. Allen, 
supra; 8 expenditure of public funds for transportation Of stu-' 
dents to church-sponsored schools, Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, supra; 9 federal grants for conegebuildings of church-
sponsored institutions of higher education combining secular 
and religious education, .;Tilton, supra; 10 noncategorical 
grants to church-sponsored COileges and universities, Roemer 
v. Board of Public Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976); and the tax 
exemptions for church properties sanctioned in Walz, supra. 
It would also require that we view it as more o~ndorse­
ment of religion than the Sunday Closing Laws upheld in 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); 11 the release 
timeprogram for religious training in Z orach, supra; and the 
legislative prayers upheld in Marsh, supra. 
We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving 
from inclusion of the creche than from these benefits and en-
dorsements previously held not violative of the Establish-
8 The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make it more likely 
that some children choose to attend a sectarian school. .. . " 392 U. S., at 
244. 
• In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is undoubtedly true that 
children are helped to get to church schools," and that "some of the chil-
dren might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were compelled 
to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets ... " 330 U. S., 
at 17. 
'"We recognized in Tilton that the construction grants "surely aid[ed]" 
the institutions that received them. 403 U.S., at 679. 
11 "In McGowan v. Maryland . .. Sunday Closing Laws were sustained 
even though one of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat 
more likely that citizens would respect religious institutions and even at-
tend religious services." Nyquist, supra, at 776. 
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ment Clause. What was said about the legislative prayers in 
Marsh, supra, at --, and implied about the Sunday Closing 
Laws in McGowan is true of the City's inclusion of the creche: 
its "reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize 
with the tenets of some ... religions." See McGowan, 
supra, at 442. 
This case differs significantly from Larkin v. Grendel's 
Den, supra, and McCollum, supra, where religion was sub-
stantially aided. In Grendel's Den, important governmental 
power-a licensing veto authority-had been vested in 
churches. In McCollum, government had made religious in-
struction available in public school classrooms; the State had 
not only used the public school buildings for the teaching of 
religion, it had "afford[ed] sectarian groups an invaluable aid 
. .. [by] provid[ing] pupils for their religious classes through 
use of the State's compulsory public school machinery." 333 
U. S., at 212. No comparable benefit to religion is discern-
ible here. 
The dissent asserts some observers may perceive that the 
City has aligned itself with the Christian faith by including a 
Christian symbol in its display and that this serves to ad-
vance religion. We can assume, arguendo, that the display 
advances religion in a sense; but our precedents plainly con-
template that on occasion some advancement of religion will 
result from governmental action. The Court has made it 
abundantly clear, however, that "not every law that confers 
an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon [religion] is, 
for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." Nyquist, 
supra, at 771; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S:-263~273 
(1981). Here, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to 
all religions, is indirect, remote and incidental; display of the 
creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion 
than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the ori-
gins of the Holiday itself as "Christ's Mass," or the exhibition 
of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally 
supported museums. 
~ c; Jz_ 
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opposite message. See generally Abington School District 
v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). 
Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1970), as a v~ide to detecting these two forms of unconstitutional gov-
ernment action. 1 It has never been entirely clear, however, 
"? how the three parts of the test relate to the principles en-
• shrined in the Establishment Clause. Focusing on institu-
7 tiona! entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of re-
.. ligion clarifies the Lemon teS'tas atiarurtyl:Ical device. 
II 
In this case, as even the District Court found, there is no 
institutional entanglement. Nevertheless, the appellees 
contend that the political divisiveness caused by Pawtucket's 
display of its creche violates the excessive-entanglement 
prong of the Lemon test. The Court's opinion follows the 
suggestion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. --, --, n: 11 
1 The Court wrote in Lemon v. Kurtzman that a statute must pass three 
tests to withstand Establishment Clause challenge. 
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its prin-
cipal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government 
entanglement with religion."' 403 U. S., at 612-613 (citations omitted). 
Though phrased as a uniformly applicable test for constitutionality, this 
three-part test "provides 'no more than (a] helpful signpost' in dealing with 
Establishment Clause challenges." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. --,--
(1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 741 (1973)). 
Moreover, the Court has held that a statute or practice that plainly em-
bodies an intentional discrimination among religions must be closely fitted 
to a compelling state purpose in order to survive constitutional challenge. 
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982). As the Court's opinion ob-
serves, ante, at 17, n. 13, this case does not involve such discrimination. 
The Larson standard, I believe, may be assimilated to the Lemon test in 
the clarified version I propose. Plain intentional discrimination should 
give rise to a presumption, which may be overcome by a showing of com-
pelling purpose and close fit, that the challenged government conduct con-
stitutes an endorsement of the favored religion or a disapproval of the 
disfavored. 
_::5' 0 '< 
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(1983), and concludes that "no inquiry into potential political 
divisiveness is even called for" in this case. Ante, at 14. In 
my view, political divisiveness along religious lines should not 
be an independent test of constitutionality. 
Although several of our cases have discussed political divi-
siveness under the entanglement prong of Lemon, see, e. g., 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 
796 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 623, we have "l 
never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for 
holding a government practice unconstitutional. Guessing 
the potential for political divisiveness inherent in a govern-
ment practice is simply too speculative an enterprise, in part 
because the existence of the litigation, as this case illustrates, 
itself may affect the political response to the government 
practice. Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil ad- { 
dressed by the Establishment Clause. Its existence may be 
evidence that institutional entanglement is excessive or that 
a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of reli-
gion. But the constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately 
on the character of the government activity that might cause 
such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself. The entan- / 
glement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to insti- } 
tutional entanglement. 
III 
The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has en-
dorsed Christianity by its display of the creche. To answer 
that question, we must examine both what Pawtucket in-
tended to communicate in displaying the creche and what 
message the City's display actually conveyed. The purpose 
and effect prongs of the Lemon test represent these two as-
pects of the meaning of the City's action. 
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both 
on the intention of the speaker and on the "objective" mean-
ing of the statement in the community. Some listeners need 
not rely solely on the words themselves in discerning the 
speaker's intent: they can judge the intent by, for example, 
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examining the context of the statement or asking questions of 
the speaker. Other listeners do not have or will not seek ac-
cess to such evidence of intent. They will rely instead on the 
words themselves; for them the message actually conveyed 
may be something not actually intended. If the audience is 
large, as it always is when government "speaks" by word or 
deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a 
message determined by the "objective" content of the state-
ment, and some portion will inevitably receive the intended 
message. Examination of both the subjective and the objec-
tive components of the message communicated by a govern-
ment action is therefore necessary to determine whether the 
action carries a forbidden meaning. 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether gov-
ernment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of reli-
gion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of govern-
ment's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact 
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An af-
firmative answer to either question should render the chal-
lenged practice invalid. 
A 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a gov-
\ 
ernment activity have a secular purpose. That requirement 
~ is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secu-
,..--J lar purpose, however dominated by religious purposes. In 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980), for example, the Court 
held that posting copies of the Ten Commandments in schools 
violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test, yet the State 
plainly had some secular objectives, such as instilling most of 
the values of the Ten Commandments and illustrating their 
connection to our legal system, but see id., at 41. See also 
Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, 374 U. S., at 
t 
223-224. The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of 
Lemon, I submit, is whether the government intends to con-
vey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion. 
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Applying that formulation to this case, I would find that 
Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of endorse-
ment of Christianity or disapproval of non Christian religions. 
The evident purpose of including the creche in the larger dis-
play was not promotion of the religious content of the creche 
but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional 
symbols. Celebration of public holidays, which have cultural 
significance even if they also have religious aspects, is a le-
gitimate secular purpose. 
The District Court's finding that the display of the creche 
had no secular purpose was based on erroneous reasoning. 
The District Court believed that it should ascertain the City's 
purpose in displaying the creche separate and apart from the 
general purpose in setting up the display. It also found that, 
because the tradition-celebrating purpose was suspect in the 
court's eyes, the City's use of an unarguably religious symbol 
"raises an inference" of intent to endorse. When viewed in 
light of correct legal principles, the District Court's finding of 
unlawful purpose was clearly erroneous. 
B 
Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disap-
proval of religion makes clear that the effect prong of the 
Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation 
of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, 
even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of reli-
gion. The laws upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 
U. S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious, educational, 
and charitable organizations), in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420 (1960) (mandatory Sunday closing law), and in 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (released time from 
school for off-campus religious instruction), had such effects, 
but they did not violate the Establishment Clause. What is 
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of 
communicating a message of government endorsement or dis-
approval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, 
